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Cybersecurity has become an increasingly important concern for both military and civilian infrastructure globally. Because of the complexity that comes with wireless networks, adversaries
have many means of infiltration and disruption of wireless networks. While there is much research
done in defending these networks, understanding the robustness of these networks is tantamount
for both designing new networks and examining possible security deficiencies in preexisting networks. This dissertation proposes to examine the robustness of wireless networks on three major
fronts: the physical layer, the data-link layer, and the network layer. At the physical layer, denialof-service jamming attacks are considered, and both additive interference and no interference are
modeled in an optimal configuration and five common network topologies. At the data-link layer,
data transmission efficacy and denial-of-sleep attacks are considered with the goal of maximizing
throughput under a constrained lifetime. At the network layer, valid and anomalous communications are considered with the goal of classifying those anomalous communications apart from

valid ones. This dissertation proposes that a thorough analysis of the aforementioned three layers
provides valuable insights to robustness on general wireless networks.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background and Motivation
Communication networks that enable the aerial transferal of data without the use of cables or

wires are referred to as wireless networks. There are a variety of types of these networks, such
as the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), Ad Hoc Network (AHN), and the Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN). WSNs, typically found in locations that do not share much human traffic, such
as polar tundras or deserts, consist of a large number of sensor nodes typically designed to run
at low power and continuous gather data, such as weather data; this data is then fed to some
operator. AHNs are self-contained, limited-run networks designed to be built and allow wireless
communication where there is not much infrastructure, and these are typically not meant to be
permanent installations; examples of AHNs include military outposts or in areas hit by severe
natural disasters such as hurricanes. The WLAN is perhaps the most abundant and well-known
as it is used by businesses and homes all over the world, relying on towers and satellites to act
as transceivers and keep phones and computers in near-constant communication. Unfortunately,
though these networks are easily maintained and moved, sending information over the air allows
for adversaries to more easily disrupt the networks.
There are a variety of types of attacks of wireless networks that each target different attributes,
or layers, of the networks. Wireless networks are made of seven abstract layers [105]: the physical
1

layer, the data-link layer, the network layer, the transport layer, the session layer, the presentation
layer, and the application layer. The physical layer is the transceiver that drives the signals on
the network. Attacks on this layer are well understood and referred to as denial-of-service (DoS),
which include jamming attacks, attacks that send enough signal that communication signals are
overwhelmed and nodes are completely disrupted. The data-link layer is responsible for creating
the frames that move across the network, ensuring that communication is maintained and consistent, and while attacks on this layer are varied, one of the more known types of attacks are
the denial-of-sleep (DoSL) attacks, such as vampire attacks, that force transceivers to continually
transmit information (legitimate or otherwise) at the expensive of the limited battery. The network
layer is responsible for creating the packets that move across the network and generates packets of
communication information, such as IP addresses at both the source and destination, and botnets
and malware typically attack this layer. The transport layer establishes the connection between
applications on different hosts, while the session layer provides the means for opening, closing,
and managing sessions between application processes. The presentation layer translates the data
for the network, and the application layer is a group of applications requiring network communications. Some viruses may attack each of these layers. This dissertation focuses on the physical,
data-link, and network layers. Figure 1 [35] illustrates these layers.

2

Figure 1.1: Physical Layer

The development of more powerful computers saw an increase in modeling optimization problems for examining wireless networks’ robustness to attacks and attack efficacy on networks as
well as the advent of machine and deep learning for identifying malicious communications such as
malware. In this dissertation, we examine these networks that are under attack at the three bottom
most layers: the physical layer, the data-link layer, and the network layer. We look how these networks withstand DoS and DoSL attacks, including how to create a network that can best mitigate a
jamming attack and how the throughput of a network under a lifetime constraint is diminished by
a DoSL attack, and we also examine the efficacy of a network to identify malicious communication. In any scenario, civilian or military, it is important not only to diminish an adversary’s attack
but also examine the robustness of one’s own network under the threat of such attacks. Thus this
dissertation outlines and summarizes three new works studying these attacks. The rest of this dissertation is outlined as follows: Section 2 specifies the actual problems being solved and outlines
3

the current works in progress, Section 3 summarizes the importance of this work and makes clear
the contributions, and Section 4 provides a timeline of the remainder of this dissertation

1.2

Related Literature
This literature review provides a summary of the literature related to general wireless network

robustness, including attacks and defenses, which is the core of the areas discussed in this dissertation. More detailed reviews of the literature pertaining to each individual area are contained within
their respective chapters of the dissertation that follow.
Vadlamani, et al. detail a variety of attacks on wireless networks that primarily affect the
physical layer [119]. The majority of these techniques constitute general denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks, of which jamming is a widely researched topic within. General DoS attacks on any layer in
the network have also been detailed along with means of detecting such attacks [16]. These types
of attacks have been localized to specific types of networks, such as wireless sensor networks [63,
126] and other energy-constrained networks [129] as well as on ad hoc networks [43, 131]. From
an operations point-of-view, the impacts of these types of attacks have been studied [1] with the
goal of making them more secure, as well as the feasibility of such attacks and defenses occurring
[127], including the use of specific functionalities like cognitive radios and directed antennae [108].
In general, however, much of this work assumes the network has been pre-established and does not
consider building an optimal network from the ground-up. Those that do [27] do not consider
the actual impacts of jammers nor how topologies may be exploited to mitigate such attacks. In
this dissertation, we consider how topology plays a special role in the efficacy of jammers by
considering several pre-specified topologies and examining jammer behaviors across each of them.
4

In the case that a network is built from the ground-up, we demonstrate that significant connectivity
can be established, thus demonstrating the importance of initial planning and development.
Energy efficiency in lifetime-constrained networks, such as wireless sensor networks, is also
of interest, where authors have studied numerous attempts to maximizing network lifetime under
varying conditions [96, 130, 42]. As well, work has been done in maximizing not lifetime but
throughput [47, 48, 79], with some works seeking to maximize both as a multi-objective criterion [2]. Such maximum flow-type problems, however, do not consider attacks by denial-of-sleep
(DoSL) devices that seek to drain the batteries of nodes in these networks. While work has been
done in trying to prevent such attacks [13, 12], the actual impacts of such attacks are largely unknown. Here, we provide a first look at how much impact DoSL devices have on throughput by
not only considering their optimal placement but also show how not only are DoSL devices likely
to bottleneck a network, but trying to give nodes more powerful batteries does not significantly
reduce the efficacy of the DoSL attack.
Of course, all the aforementioned works have one major goal in mind: allow information to
transmit across the network, with the goal of having communication at all or sending specific communication from one point to another efficiently. Whether this information is normal or anomalous
is a widely researched topic [55, 133]. As anomalous communications, such as botnets, become
more stealthy, there is ever a need to consider not specific protocols within the botnet but the
underlying structure. As such, graph analytics have been employed with mixed results, often relying on a priori knowledge of botnet architecture [124, 87, 32]. What has helped the detection of
botnets has been the advent and rapidly growing interest in machine learning and deep learning.
Many suitable techniques have been examined and benchmarked thoroughly [10, 67], though these
5

techniques typically fail on larger or real datasets. To overcome the issues of traditional machine
learning, deep learning and artificial neural networks have been deployed [118, 90]. However,
these, too, fall in the trap of considering only specific botnets. While some efforts have been made
at detecting general botnets on large-scale networks [41], accuracy has generally been mixed. This
is likely a result of too few botnets existing in the data and models generally being unable to detect
smaller, more hidden botnets. Our work moves away from this to examine the communication
behaviors directly rather than inferencing upon a given node, an important consideration given the
stealthy improvements botnets have made [29].

1.3

Contributions
There are several contributions within this dissertation. For each of the three layers, a model

is provided to answer the broad question of how much legitimate throughput is successfully transmitted from a source to a destination. At the physical layer, a tri-level mixed-integer programming
model seeks to maximize total connectivity in a network is utilized. At the data-link layer, a
bi-level mixed-integer programming model seeks to maximize network throughput. At the network layer, an artificial neural network model seeks to classify botnet and nonbot (or legitimate)
communication a network while minimizing false positives (bots detected as nonbots). Within
the first two layers, we provide several insights into topological considerations by exploring random topologies as well as two established topologies, the Carnegie Melon University topology
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology topology, as well as five common topologies, all of
which will be illustrated later. Three major topological considerations are considered. The first
involves how (optimally) adding access points affects the connectivity. The second involves jam6

mer movement behaviors across several pre-established topologies. The final demonstrates that
simply adding one or two access points is not enough–there is definitely a need to add a certain
number before significant results are attained. Resulting from our topological considerations, we
point out jammer movement behavior trends and that topology plays a significant role in how jammers behave; we demonstrate that the utility of connectivity matters, and whether signal strength
or number of connections is more important plays a vital role in determining overall connectivity;
we show that fewer, powerful denial-of-sleep devices are less impacting than more, weaker devices; we show that improving battery lifetime has a largely linear relationship to improving the
performance of a network; and we show that topology is also important for mitigating the effects of
multiple denial-of-sleep devices. For both the physical and data-link layers and their mixed-integer
programming models, we apply the Implicit Enumeration algorithm to show that they are solvable
in very good time even compared to commercial solvers like Gurobi or traditional algorithms like
Branch-and-Bound. We also explore the effects of additive interference jammers may make use of
in attacking a network, something that has never been considered in other jamming papers. Finally,
we make use of more generalized features to detect malicious communications and lay a framework for how general botnets behave with the intention that our model can be any dataset, not just
the one we use, and attain good accuracy.
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CHAPTER II
PHYSICAL LAYER: WIRELESS LAN TRANSMITTER LOCATION UNDER THE THREAT
OF JAMMING ATTACKS

2.1

Introduction
Wireless networks are widely used in a variety of environments ranging from businesses to

college campuses; a key feature of such networks is that they require little to no infrastructure.
Consisting of a set of transmitters and receivers, maintaining connection to them does not necessarily require fixed positions, and thus mobility is nearly unrestricted. Both the mobility and the
limited infrastructure provide great benefit to a variety of recipients, from those who need response
in environmental disasters (where actual infrastructure may be deployed; such networks are called
ad hoc networks) to those who need to perform business transactions while in flight.
Most wireless networks are contextualized to some spatial distribution of access points, such
as transmitters, routers, or signal towers, and demand points, the users or infrastructure that need
to connect to the network. The loss of an access point can remove connections for several demand
points, while a loss of critical demand points can result in tasks being unable to be completed. Unfortunately, wireless networks are vulnerable to attacks, the most prominent one being the jammer
attack that seeks to remove connections by overwhelming all other signals.
But network signals are not typically “on/off.” In fact, attackers can find themselves in a position where their jammers are powerful enough that they can degrade signals beyond any jammer’s
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radius, and by combining this effect with other jammers, more connections are destroyed; thus
attackers have an advantage in disrupting the network. As such, defenders not only need to safeguard networks against direct jamming but also overcome aggregate interference a well-planned
attack may cause. The best way to ensure robustness against jamming is to optimally place access
points such that direct jamming and interference are mitigated, establishing a crucial role for the
defender in planning and developing a wireless network design.
The goal of this chapter is to examine the topological considerations of designing an array
of wireless access points that is resilient to jamming attacks. We consider a wireless local area
network (WLAN) that is subject to jamming attacks. To mitigate the impact of jamming, we
seek to optimally locate a set of wireless access points (devices that send signals, such as towers
or routers) over a set of potential sites and model the impact of a jamming attack as the loss
in user connectivity due to the unavailability of access points. Toward this end, we develop a
tri-level multi-period mixed-integer programming model (TL-MIP) that maximizes total network
performance under the threat of jamming.

2.2

Related Literature
The physical layer of any network is the most easily understood layer because it consists of

physical devices. As such, attacking these devices directly is simpler, in theory, than attacking
other layers that require direct network access. The wireless network jamming problem involves
placing a set of jammers in a network so as to sever connections. This problem is similar to general network interdiction in that a set of nodes are introduced to a network such that some edges
are removed. Network interdiction is an area of literature which has been extensively studied.
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Network interdiction studies have examined a variety of optimization objectives such as maximizing a shortest path [102, 50, 15], minimizing the maximum flow [3, 123], and minimizing
network connectivity [89, 5]. Researchers have also expanded this literature to include problems
such as multiple commodities [64] and multiple time periods [72], stochastic interdiction [81], and
dynamic interactions between attackers and defenders [68]. There are also studies that examine
randomness, such as random topologies [45, 46] or random behaviors from the attackers [82, 95].
Many specific applications have also resulted, some of which involve waterway commodity flows
[8], power grid vulnerability assessment [107], and interdicting nuclear smuggling [94]. Another
significant application of network interdiction is the wireless communication network interdiction,
and the forefront of this area is the jammer placement problem.
Wireless network jamming attacks are a type of denial-of-service attack on the physical layer
of a wireless network [98], and there have been several studies on specifically the placement of
jammers [91, 27, 26]. There are also a variety of studies that provide details of jamming attacks
[92, 61] and how they affect network performance [91, 9]. Expectantly, there are some studies
that focus on how to find jamming devices [99] or how to respond to an attack [69, 52], and these
studies offer some strategies for safeguarding networks. Such strategies include channel-hopping
[86], key management techniques [34], and spread spectrum techniques [66]. However, these
papers all focus solely on the placement of jammers or the improvement of an already existing
wireless infrastructure in order to mitigate attacks, such as enhancing signal antennae or changing
antennae direction, switching channels, etc. None of these papers specifically focus on the initial
construction of the wireless infrastructure with the focus of mitigating an optimal jamming attack,
nor do they consider any topological establishments.
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The key to maximizing a wireless network’s robustness amounts to placing access points so
as to increase the network’s performance (e.g., connectivity, throughput), but doing so in such a
way as to increase the number of connections or signal strength has not been considered. Further,
most jamming attacks are treated as distance-only protocols, where connections are jammed only
if access or demand points fall within a jammer’s radius. More realistically, signals are likely
to create an additive interference effect [51], and the placement of jammers that takes advantage
of this effect has never been studied. Thus, there are currently gaps in the literature involving the
optimal placement of access points designed to mitigate optimal jamming attacks, the consideration
of how resilient common and pre-established topologies are, and how any wireless network fares
against additive interference from jammers, thus preventing a realistic study of the vulnerability of
large-scale wireless networks to jamming attacks.

2.3

Problem Description
Our problem consists of a set of access points (e.g., signal towers), each with some capacity,

a set of possible access point locations, a set of jammers, and a set of possible jammer locations.
Demand points (e.g. users, laptops, cell phones) attempt to connect to some access points, but an
established connection will only occur between a demand point and a single access point if two
conditions are met: 1) the access point must not be at capacity, and 2) the new connection must be
establish-able. This means that a new connection should not be established within the model if it
falls within a jammer’s radius or could be automatically jammed under the additive interference,
which will be discussed later.
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We seek to solve the access-jammer placement problem under such a condition, that is to
optimally place the set of jammers such that the network connectivity is minimized while access
points are optimally placed to mitigate this attack. However, the attacker and defender do not
know a priori the locations of the demand points. Demand points may relocate between time;
thus, demand points strive to maximize their connectivity, and will place themselves accordingly,
particularly if they are located near a capacitated access point. Should a connection be jammed,
the demand point may be reconnected to another nearby access point if the next access point also
satisfies the previous two conditions. Thus, it is to the attacker’s advantage if the attacker not only
disrupts the total number of actual connections, but forces the jammers to be placed in such a way
that other access points reach capacity and prevent demand points from remaining connected to
the network, effectively bottle-necking the network.

2.3.1

Illustrative Example

Figure 2.1 shows a network that is being jammed. Circles represent demand points, triangles
represent jammers, the circular fields around the triangles represent their jamming radius, and
squares represent access points. The subscripts under each access point index represents the capacity of that access point. The solid lines represent a connection, while dashed lines represent
possible secondary connections that could exist if two conditions are met: 1) the demand point is
within range of the access point, and 2) the access point is not already at capacity. For example,
consider access point 2 in Figure 2.1a. Demand points 4, 5, 6, and 7 are within its range and
thus could connect to it. Although its capacity allows for only 2 demand points to connect to it,
only demand point 5 connects to it. Demand point 4 is closer to access point 1 and establishes
12

this connection without violating 1’s capacity, and demand points 6 and 7 connect to access points
3 and 4, respectively, under the same reasoning. Thus only access points 1 and 3 are at capacity. Now consider Figure 2.1b, an example where jammers have been (not necessarily optimally)
placed. Jammers 1 and 2 completely contain access points 1 and 4 and demand point 8, thus any
connections these three might have with any other demand points or access points are rendered
impossible. Demand point 4 is now assigned to access point 2 because access point 2’s capacity
was not met and demand point 4 is the first of the other possible demand points that could connect
to it. Also, as demand points 4 and 5 bring access point 2 to capacity, demand point 7 can no
longer connect to the network. Thus, even though no jammer is directly removing demand point
7 from the network, the indirect effect of forcing access point 2 to reach capacity has forced the
network to not attain the maximum possible number of connections, thus improving the impact of
jamming.
However, the illustration in Figure 2.1b may not be the optimal placement of the access points.
By keeping the jammers and demand points fixed, a slight shift in the access points’ location
as in Figure 2.1c produces 3 more established connections, suggesting the location of the access
points can have a significant influence on the impact of jamming. Thus, there is a need to study
the optimal placement of access points given a threat of an attack by optimal jammer placement,
which is precisely the focus on this chapter.
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(a) Normal Network

(b) Jammed Network A

(c) Jammed Network B

Figure 2.1: Example Network

2.4 Mathematical model
2.4.1 Tri-level mixed-integer programming model
To model the problem described in Section 2.3, we present the following Tri-Level MultiPeriod Mixed-Integer Programming [T L−M IP ] model. This model has been adopted from the rinterdiction median model, which involves locating facilities to maximize the total distance to a set
of demand points. Said problem is an inverse of the p-median problem, which strives to choose a set
14

of facilities to remove with the goal of minimizing the distance. For our problem, the access points
correspond to the facilities to be removed; specifically, our model strives to remove (by jamming)
a set of access points in order to minimize the number of demand point-access point connections.
The objective function is thus similar to those used in the facility location problems [24], where an
attacker seeks to minimize the amount of resource allocation (here, network connectivity) through
interdiction, and the defender seeks to maximize the resource allocation with the knowledge of an
attack. Our model allows for the demand points and jammers to relocate between time periods,
while jammers have a movement restriction R and a limited jamming radius. Access points also
have finite capacity, and demand points maybe reassigned to another access point if the preferred
access point is at capacity or is jammed. Our model is unique in that we also consider the additive
effect of the jammers, which we discuss further in Section 2.4.2.
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Table 2.1: List of Parameters for [T L − M IP ]
Indices
i
j
k
l
t
Parameters
Dijklt

dab
R
Sijt
n
Ck
m
c
Sets
I
J
K
L
T
Ait = {j ∈ J | 0 < Sijt }

Tijt = {q ∈ Ait | q 6= j, Siqt ≤ Sijt }

Pk = {m ∈ K | m 6= k, dkm > R}

index for demand points
index for access points
index for locations of jammers
index for jammers
index for time periods

1 if a jammer l located in position k disturb
the connectivity between access point j
and demand point i at period t; 0 otherwise
the Euclidean distance between a and b
the greatest distance that
a jammer may relocate to between time
the signal strength from access point j to
demand point i during time period t
the number of jammers available
the jamming radius of jammer k
the number of access points available
the capacity of an access point

the set of demand points
the set of locations for access points
the set of existing jammers
the set of potential locations for jammers
the set of time periods
the set of access points with capacity
such that demand point i at period t has
some positive signal strength
the set of existing access points
(not including at location j)
that are at most the same signal from
access point j for demand
point i at time period t
the set of locations of jammers (excluding k)
whose distance from k is greater than R
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Using the above notation, our MIP is split into the following three stages.

Z1 = M ax

W (y)

(2.1a)

subject to:

X

wj = m

(2.1b)

j∈J

wj ∈ {0, 1}

∀j ∈ J

(2.1c)

where

W (y) = M in

Z2

(2.2a)

subject to:

X

yklt ≤ 1 ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T

(2.2b)

yklt ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T

(2.2c)

k∈K

X
l∈L

X

yn,l,t+1 ≤ 1 − yklt

n∈Pk
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∀k ∈ K, l ∈ L, t ∈ T

(2.2d)

yklt ∈ {0, 1}

∀k ∈ K, l ∈ L, t ∈ T

(2.2e)

XXX

(2.3a)

where

Z2 = M ax

Sijt xijt

i∈I j∈J t∈T

subject to:

X

xijt = 1 ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T

[αit ]

(2.3b)

j∈Ait

X

xijt ≤ cwj

∀j ∈ Ait , t ∈ T

[βjt ]

(2.3c)

i∈I

xijt ≤ 1 −

XX

Dijklt yklt

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, t ∈ T

[γijt ]

(2.3d)

k∈K l∈L

Here, xijt ∈ {0, 1} refers to if a demand point i can establish a connection with access point in
location j during time period t; yklt ∈ {0, 1} refers to if a jammer k is in location l during time
period t; and wj ∈ {0, 1} refers to if an access point is in location j. In the first stage (2.1), the
objective function (2.1a) strives to maximize the total signal strength through the deployment of
access points, where constraint (2.1b) requires that all available access points are placed.
In the second stage (2.2), the objective function (2.2a) strives to minimize the total signal
strength through the deployment of jammers. The sets of constraints (2.2b) and (2.2c) force at
most only one jammer to exist in any given location and that all available jammers be deployed.
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The set of constraints (2.2d) restrict where the jammer may relocate based on R between time
periods.
In the third stage (2.3), the objective function (2.3a) strives to maximize the signal strength
based on the demand distribution, where the demand should seek access points with available
capacity. The set of constraints (2.3b) maintains that each demand point must be connected to
exactly one access point. In general, this may be impossible as some demand points may be too
far away from an unjammed access point with available capacity. In this case, the demand point is
assigned to a dummy access point with zero signal strength. The set of constraints (2.3c) ensures
that for each access point, only so many demand points may be connected to it as determined by the
capacity. Finally, the set of constraints (2.3d) forces all interdicted connections to have zero signal
strength. For the sets of constraints (2.3b), (2.3c), and (2.3d), we have labeled the dual variables
αit , βjt , and γijt , respectively, that we will use later.
For the demand point placement distribution, we use a spatial Poisson process, which is a
multi-dimensional generalization of the Poisson point process. Precisely, a spatial Poisson process
with uniform intensity β > 0 is a point process in R2 such that for each bounded, closed, disjoint
set Bi , 1 ≤ i ≤ M for some integer M > 0, the count N (Bi ) has a Poisson distribution with
mean βλ(Bi ) where λ(Bi ) is the area of Bi and N (B1 ), ..., N (Bm ) are independent. We divide
our region R intoa ×
b cells, and each cell Bi satisfies the inter-arrival property P(N (Bi ) =
n k
n−k

k | N (R) = n) = 
  p (1 − p) , where n is the maximum number of demand points within
k
our region R and k is the number of demand points arriving into cell Bi , where p = λ(Bi )/λ(R).
Realistically, demand points can only move so far between time periods. However, for the sake
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of our model’s tractability, we reassign the demand distribution between time periods according to
the above process.
Though we use a specific utility function given by equation (2.3a), there are a variety of interpretations on maximizing network connectivity, and we discuss this further in Section 2.6.4, where
we consider three variants.
The [T L − M IP ] program can be simplified into a bi-level program by taking the dual of the
third stage and combining this dual and the second stage into a single stage. This invokes strong
duality which is normally a problem for our third stage, where xijt is a binary variable. However,
by fixing the decision variables and relaxing the binary constraint, the third stage becomes an
assignment problem in which the constraint matrix is known to be totally uni-modular. Thus we
can guarantee the solutions of xijt will be 0 or 1 under relaxation, and this relaxation allows us to
proceed with the dual reformulation. The dual of the third stage is presented below.

ZD = M in

XXX
XX
(αit + cβjt + (1 −
Dijklt yklt )γijt )
i∈I j∈J t∈T

(2.4a)

k∈K l∈L

subject to:

XX
X
XX
(
αit +
βjt +
γijt ) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ I
t∈T

i∈I

j∈Ait

(2.4b)

i∈I j∈J

αit , βjt , γijt ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ait , t ∈ T
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(2.4c)

Substituting this dual into the second stage, we can now formulate the modified Bi-Level
Mixed-Integer program [BL − M IP ] as follows.

Z1 = M ax

W (y)

(2.5a)

subject to:

X

wj ≤ m

(2.5b)

j∈J

wj ∈ {0, 1}

∀j ∈ J

(2.5c)

where

W (y) = M in

XXX
XX
(αit + cβijt + (1 −
Dijklt yklt )γijt )
i∈I j∈J t∈T

(2.6a)

k∈K l∈L

subject to:

X

yklt ≤ 1 ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T

(2.6b)

yklt ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T

(2.6c)

k∈K

X
l∈L

X

yn,l,t+1 ≤ 1 − yklt

n∈Pk
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∀k ∈ k, l ∈ L, t ∈ T

(2.6d)

XX
X
XX
(
αit +
βjt +
γijt ) ≥ 1
t∈T

i∈I

j∈J

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ait , t ∈ T

(2.6e)

i∈I j∈J

αit , βijt , γijt ≥ 0

yklt ∈ {0, 1}

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, t ∈ T

∀k ∈ K, l ∈ L, t ∈ T

(2.6f)

(2.6g)

In the objective function, the product of yklt and γijt can be linearized in the usual way by
defining a new non-negative variable zijklt and imposing the following constraints: zijklt ≤ yklt γijt ,
zijklt ≤ γijt , and zijklt ≥ γijt − (1 − yklt )M , where these constraints are given for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J,
k ∈ K, l ∈ L, and t ∈ T where appropriate, and M is a large number. The mixed-integer nature
of this problem makes it difficult to solve. To overcome this difficulty, our solution methodologies,
discussed in Section 2.5, will incorporate relaxation on these integer constraints. We conclude
this section with the remark that the above model assumes that jammers work independently from
one another; access or demand points within the radius of any jammer are completely jammed,
and adding more jammers to an area does not increase jamming impact where jammers’ effects
overlap. The above model is referred to as the non-additive model.

2.4.2

Additive Interference

As the previous section assumes no additive effects from multiple jammers, we now consider
the presence of additive interference [51]. Here, the jammers may work together to interfere with
connections even when access or demands are not within their radii. Figure 2.2 illustrates this. Un22

der a non-additive effect, connection is allowed. However, under an additive effect, the connection
is interfered with, even though no single jammer captures the access or demand point within their
radii. This is because in the additive model the jamming interference present at the connection is
the sum of the interference caused by each jammer. If the interference is large enough, the connection is jammed in the sense that no connection can be established between the access point and
demand point.

Figure 2.2: Additive Interference from Jammers

This effect is known as the additive (or physical) interference model. In this model, the signal
strength for access point j trying to connect to a given demand point i during time period t is given
by the formula Sijt = Pj Gijt , where

Gijt = (
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ω η
)
dijt

(2.7)

is the gain between access point j and demand point i during time period t, Pj is the transmission
power of access point j, ω is a positive parameter and η is the path loss exponent. The signal to
interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at demand point i from access point j at period t is

SIN Rijt =

N+

S
P ijt

q∈K\{k}

Siqt

(2.8)

where N is the ambient noise. A connection is considered successful if SIN Rijt ≥ σ, where σ is
some SINR threshold. These equations have been well-demonstrated [51]. The original model
(equations (2.1a)-(2.3d)) considers a connection to be nonexistent under the set of constraints
(2.3d), where access or demand points and jammers only need to be within some distance from
each other. Under this additive interference model, however, we may replace the aforementioned
constraint with the following new one, which, after removing the fractions, is:

Pj Gijt xijt +Mijt (1−xijt ) ≥ σ(

X

Pq Giqt yqlt +N )

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K, l ∈ L, t ∈ T (2.9)

q∈K\{k}

where Mijt is a large number. This end result comes from Capone, et al. [14]; as they explain, the Mijt parameter in this inequality makes the problem substantially more difficult to solve.
However, they derived an exact reformulation that simplifies the above equation into a covering
constraint problem instead of a SINR constraint problem, transforming the equation into (with
corresponding dual variable ιijlt )

24

X

yqlt ≤ |C| − xijt

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, l ∈ L, t ∈ T, C ⊂ C :

q∈C

X

Gqit > rijt

(2.10)

q∈C

where the set C ⊂ K\{k} is a cover if

P

q∈C

Gqjt > rijt and C is the set of all covers. The

set of constraints (2.10) demands that if jammers are placed at all of the locations in a cover,
there can be no connection for the access-demand point (i, j) pair. The construction of the cover
demonstrates the additive effect of the jammers, where the jammers work together to create more
interference than the signal strength of an access-demand point (i, j) pair. Here, rijt =

Sijt
σ

−N

is effectively the normalization of an access-demand point connection as the ratio of the signal
strength Sij to some lower limit threshold σ and free of noise N ; thus, rijt is a noise threshold
such that if the cumulative noise caused by a set of jammers is more than rijt , then that set forms a
cover. From here, the third stage in the new additive tri-level mixed-integer program [AT LM IP ]
is

Z2 = M ax

XXX

Sijt xijt

(2.11)

i∈I j∈J t∈T

subject to:

X

xijt = 1 ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T

[αit ]

(2.12)

j∈Ait

X

xijt ≤ cwj

∀j ∈ J, t ∈ T

i∈I
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[βjt ]

(2.13)

XX

yqlt ≤ |C| − xijt

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, t ∈ T, C ⊂ C :

l∈L q∈C

X

Gqit > rijt

[ιijtC ]

(2.14)

q∈C

Fixing yqlt , we can take the dual of this and combine it with the second stage under the same
idea as in the [T L − M IP ] which allows us to relax a binary constraint on xijt , giving us the new
second stage for the additive bi-level program [ABLM IP ]

W (y) = M in

XXX

[αit + cβijt +

i∈I j∈J t∈T

X

ιijtC (|C| −

C∈C

XX

yqlt )]

(2.15a)

l∈L q∈C

subject to:

X

yklt ≤ 1 ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T

(2.15b)

yklt ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T

(2.15c)

k∈K

X
l∈L

X

yn,l,t+1 ≤ 1 − yklt

∀k ∈ k, l ∈ L, t ∈ T

(2.15d)

n∈Pk

XX
X
XXX
(
αit +
βjt +
ιijlt ) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ait , t ∈ T
t∈T

i∈I

j∈J

(2.15e)

i∈I j∈J l∈L

αit , βijt , ιijtC ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, t ∈ T, C ∈ C
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(2.15f)

yklt ∈ {0, 1}

∀k ∈ K, l ∈ L, t ∈ T

(2.15g)

Thus, we propose two models: the non-additive model given by (2.1a)-(2.3d), and the additive
model which replaces the set of constraints (2.3d) with the set of constraints (2.10). Again, we
note that the product of yqlt and ιijtC can be linearized in a similar manner as the previous model.

2.5 Solution Methodologies
2.5.1 Branch-and-bound
Because of the mixed-integer nature of the problem, the classic branch-and-bound algorithm as
developed by Bard and Moore [7] can be employed on [BL − M IP ] directly without modification.
We use this basic algorithm as a benchmark for computational tractability since commercial solvers
cannot easily solve a multi-level mixed-integer program. We define for each sub-problem s the
leader problem L as the top level, the follower problem F as the bottom level, and the high-point
problem HP P as both levels with the objective value of F removed. We define αLs and β Ls
as the vector of lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the integer variables controlled by L,
and we define αF s and β F s as the vector of lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the integer
variables controlled by F . The sets of these bounds, respectively, are HsL = {(αLs , β Ls )} and
HsF = {(αF s , β F s )}. The sets of indices of the integer variables restricted in sub-problem s are,
respectively, SsL = {q : αjLs > 0 or βjLs < U BjL } for L, with F done similarly. Algorithm 2.1
details the algorithm.
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Algorithm 2.1 Branch and Bound
1: Initialization: Set the iteration number s = 0, the current optimal solution z = −∞, the
parameters of the sets of bounds, and put the sets of indices for the bounds as empty.
2:

Upper bounds and fathoming: Attempt to find the solution of HP P and determine the
optimal objective value, zHP P . If zHP P ≤ z or HP P is infeasible, go to Step 7.

3:

Continuous solution: Attempt to solve the relaxed bi-level program. If infeasible, go to Step
7. Otherwise, store and fix the current solution.

4:

Branching: If integrality requirements are satisfied by the current solution, go to Step 5.
Otherwise, select a fractional-valued variable and place a bound on it. Iterate s = s + 1, and
update the sets of bounds and indices for the bounds. Return to Step 2.

5:

Bi-level feasible solution: Fix the current solution w(m) = (wj )j∈J and solve F to obtain
(m)
y (m) = (yklt )k∈K,l∈L,t∈T . Compute Z, and if Z > z, set z = Z, storing the new optimal
solution.

6:

Integer branching: If each upper and lower bound is equal to each other for both of L and
F , go to Step 7. Otherwise, select one inequality from either of the sets of bounds and update
the bound by decreasing the upper bound or increasing the lower bound, depending on the
inequality chosen and which set it comes from. Iterate s = s + 1 and update the sets of bounds
and the sets of indices for the bounds. Return to Step 2.

7:

Backtracking: If not undetermined node exists, go to Step 8. Otherwise, branch to the newest
undetermined node, iterate s = s + 1, and update the sets of bounds and sets of indices for the
bounds.

8:

Stopping criterion: If z = −∞, no feasible solution exists. Otherwise, terminate algorithm
with the optimal solution.

(m)
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2.5.2

Implicit enumeration

The tri-level model with binary variables makes the above models (both the additive and nonadditive) difficult to solve. In [BL − M IP ], the binary bottom-level decision variables make
this problem computationally complex, and we cannot reduce the problem to a single level mixedinteger program. An implicit enumeration methodology was derived by Scaparra and Church [111]
for planning the defense of a logistic network, and we can employ the methodology directly here.
This methodology seeks to find an optimal solution through a search tree, wherein the optimal set of
access-demand point connections must identify at least one “critical” location, namely the location
that can establish some maximal utility for some set of demand points that could be interdicted.
Failure to place an access point at this location would force the utility to become minimized, thus
creating a “worst-case” scenario of access-demand point connections that can never be established.
Borrowing terminology from the branch-and-bound algorithm, the algorithm starts at the root
of the search tree by solving the lower level of the [BL − M IP ] such that no access points are
placed, thus seeking to jam as many demand points as possible. The optimal interdiction solution
provides branches of the root with location placements for the access points, and at least one
of these solutions must be realized. Branching continues until there are no more access points
(transforming the branch into a leaf) or there are no more feasible locations to place the access
points. The optimal solution is the feasible placement with the largest value of the upper-level
objective function. Call the optimal solution value from either the additive or non-additive model
Z. Algorithm 2.2 details the algorithm.
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Algorithm 2.2 Implicit Enumeration
1: Initialization: Initialize the node set M with the root node associated with no placement of
access points, i.e., wj = 0, ∀j ∈ J, and set the optimal solution to z = −∞.
2:

Node processing: Select and remove a node m from M . If n is the root node or was created
from setting any wj = 1, then solve the corresponding lower-level problem for the correspond(m)
(m)
(m)
ing vector w(m) = (wj )j∈J , providing the vector y (m) = (yklt )k∈K,l∈L,t∈T . Define OJ as
the set of suitable locations for all the access points, and determine then a set of suitable loca(m)
(m)
tions for each wj in OJ . If Z > z, set z = Z, storing the new optimal solution.

3:

Pruning: If there is no better placement for the access points, or if OJ
is a leaf, and go to Step 5.

4:

Branching: Choose a location j from the set of possible locations OJ and create two new
nodes. One node forces wj = 1, the other forces wj = 0. Add the newly created nodes to the
set M .

5:

Stopping criterion: If the node set M is empty, terminate the algorithm with the optimal
solution; otherwise, return to Step 2.

(m)

is empty, the branch

(m)

2.5.3

Dynamic constraint generation for additive model

Under the additive model, the set of constraints (2.14) poses a computational challenge as the
number of covers grows exponentially. To address this issue we consider a restricted problem in
which our set of covers C is not complete. Let C¯ ⊂ C, and so we desire to add covers to C¯ as needed.
We propose a method of dynamically generating such sets using a cutting plane approach. Cutting
plane approaches have been used frequently within the literature. Medal [75] uses a similar method
to solve a jamming problem subject to a different kind of interference. Israeli and Wood [50]
developed the method to maximize the shortest path an interdicted network. Zeng and Zhao [128]
developed a more general algorithm for solving general two-stage robust optimization problems.
And Dallaire, et al. [30] also developed such an algorithm to solve a transit crew scheduling
problem. Let C¯ be the set of covers found so far, then the restricted form of this set of constraints
is:
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XX

yqlt ≤ |C| − xijt

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, t ∈ T, C ∈ C¯

(2.16)

l∈L q∈C

In order to generate new constraints (2.14) that are maximally violated for the incumbent solution, we introduce new, binary variables ul that decide whether a given location for a jammer
(and so whether a given jammer) is placed within the set of covers. We then solve the following
separation problem for each (i, j, t) triplet corresponding to a given access and demand point at
some time period:

∗
zijt
(x̂, ŷ) = M ax

X

ŷklt ul −

X

l∈L

ul + x̂ijt

(2.17a)

l∈L

subject to:

XX

Gkjt ul > rijt

∀j ∈ J, t ∈ T

(2.17b)

l∈L k∈K

ul ∈ {0, 1}

∀l ∈ L

(2.17c)

Here, x̂, x̂ijt , ŷ, and ŷklt are the incumbent solutions found in the algorithm. In the branchand-bound algorithm, whenever a new incumbent solution is found, the separation problem is
solved for each (i, j, t) triplet, and whenever

P

l∈L

P

q∈C

ŷqlt > |C| − x̂ijt , we append the new

¯ where u∗ is the optimal solution to the separation problem. In
cover {l ∈ L : u∗l = 1} to C,
l
the implicit enumeration algorithm, the same procedure is done during the node processing step
when an incumbent y (m) vector is found. Specifically, the dynamic constraint generation process
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is implemented as such: first, a feasible solution in (x, y) is found; second, the dynamic constraint
generation methodology is employed; third, the dual parameter(s) for the new constraint(s) are
added into the bi-level program; finally, the algorithm continues, and this process repeats with new
incumbent solutions.

2.6

Computational analysis
In this section we examined how different topologies of the wireless access points affected

the placement and movement trends of the jammers. In many cases, access points either have
already been placed and, if relocatable, are limited in movement, or the planner of the network
must locate access points according to the layout of structures across the region. In these cases,
we were interested in analyzing how common topologies compared against the optimal placement
of access points. For these prespecified access point topologies we did not consider the first stage
in the original model, instead using the simplified bi-level mixed-integer program [BLM IP ] that
considered only equations (2.6a)-(2.6g). We considered five topologies, named Partite, Perimeter,
Dense, Spacious, and Median, illustrated in Figure 2.3, which also includes one instance of an
optimal topology, named Optimal, generated from solving one problem instance. All experiments
were run using a Dell OptiPlex 7050 running Windows 10 on 8 dedicated Intel Core i7-7700 processors running at 3.6 GHz with 16 GB RAM. The algorithms were encoded using Python 2.7 with
sub-problems solved using Gurobi 7.5.1 and Pyomo 5.2.
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(a) Partite

(b) Perimeter

(c) Dense

(d) Spacious

(e) Median

(f) Optimal

Figure 2.3: Wireless Topologies

The Partite topology had three distinct clusters of access points such that each cluster was
far enough from each other cluster such that a demand point too centered between two clusters
would possibly be unable to connect to any access point in any cluster. Thus demand points should
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have needed to cluster around and within each group. This is akin to several, central facilities,
each requiring its own dedicated network, with each partition having its own, often high, demand
needs. The Perimeter topology had all access points uniformly distributed across the perimeter
of the region with some distance between each access point and the edge of the region to allow
demand points to move freely around any access point. Here, demand points would typically be
far away from other demand points. The Dense topology had all access points clustered around a
central hub, which we took as a ball centered in the region. This is akin to a critical location that
may operate on its own network and requires constant connectivity with large demand, regardless
of the rest of the region’s demand for connectivity. The Spacious topology had all access points
distributed randomly across the entire region such that no two access points were too close to
one another. Here, demand points were almost always in the range of at most one or two access
points. This was the most random topology, where overall demand for connectivity was uniform
across the entire region. The Median topology had all access points distributed uniformly across
the diagonals and central vertical and horizontal lines within the region. We note that there is some
clustering in the center of the region under this topology. This topology is akin to a campus for
which there is some network connectivity over the entire campus, but there is a main “center” (not
necessarily the center of the region) with high demand for connectivity. We note that the images
are examples only for illustration purposes and do not necessarily contain the coordinates used in
our experiments.
For all five topologies, we considered three experiments of 10, 25, and 50 access points, each
with a capacity of 15, 5 jammers with jamming radius of 150 feet, and 5 time periods, giving 15
experiments. Each region was 1 square mile. The demand was realized ten times, with 100 demand
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points, and the results were averaged. Each of the ten realizations was repeated across all fifteen
experiments such that realization i for experiment m is the same as realization i for experiment n.
In the first half of Section 2.6.2 with regards to Figure 2.4, we compared both the additive and nonadditive models. However, because the additive is more interesting and more realistic, beginning
with the second half of Section 2.6.2 with regards to Table 2.5 and onward, we only showed the
results of the additive model ([AT LM IP ] from Section 2.4.2).

2.6.1

Run-time of solution methodologies and model comparison

First, we examined the run-time solutions of the non-additive model for two methodologies:
branch-and-bound and implicit enumeration. Table 2.3 shows the results.

Experiment
Optimal-10
Optimal-25
Optimal-50
Partite-10
Partite-25
Partite-50
Perimeter-10
Perimeter-25
Perimeter-50
Dense-10
Dense-25
Dense-50
Spacious-10
Spacious-25
Spacious-50
Median-10
Median-25
Median-50

Table 2.3: Run-time of non-additive model
Branch-and-Bound (secs) Implicit Enumeration (secs)
356
86
588
123
1253
165
93
27
183
41
307
59
67
18
126
29
237
41
92
30
192
55
401
74
127
47
336
63
771
84
105
28
221
43
518
60
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Each experiment is listed as the name of the topology and the number of access points for
that experiment. For example, Partite-25 was the experiment with the partite topology and 25
access points. The Optimal experiment was the original optimal placement of the access points
[T L − M IP ]. The implicit enumeration algorithm significantly outperformed the branch-andbound algorithm. Furthermore, the scalability of the implicit enumeration scheme was relatively
stable, where even as the access points doubled, the solution run-time was nearly linear, unlike the
branch-and-bound which seemed to grow as rapidly as the as the access points did. As expected,
the Optimal experiments took longer than the prespecified topologies because the Optimal required
the top level of the tri-level model, where the predetermined locations precluded the need. Excluding the Optimal experiments, the Spacious topology took the longest to solve while the Perimeter
took the shortest, with an average of 30 seconds between them. This detail and the disparities
across all the topologies showed that the topology played a significant role in computational time.
We then examined the run-time solutions of the additive model for three methodologies: branchand-bound with dynamically generated covers, implicit enumeration, and implicit enumeration
with dynamically generated covers. We omitted the standard branch-and-bound because the smallest problems with only 10 access points each took over thirty minutes to solve, and so we highlighted the significance of the other techniques. Table 2.4 shows the results.
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Table 2.4: Run-time of additive model
Experiment BBDGC (secs) IE (secs) IEDGC (secs)
Optimal-10
102
103
14
Optimal-25
158
161
18
Optimal-50
222
231
21
Partite-10
38
43
6
Partite-25
61
71
8
Partite-50
97
108
9
Perimeter-10
20
29
3
Perimeter-25
46
58
6
Perimeter-50
81
90
8
Dense-10
69
76
6
Dense-25
120
127
10
Dense-50
173
182
14
Spacious-10
77
83
7
Spacious-25
140
148
12
Spacious-50
191
207
15
Median-10
40
52
5
Median-25
80
89
9
Median-50
124
132
12

The BBDGC column shows the run-time of the branch-and-bound algorithm with dynamically generated covers. The IE column shows the run-time of the implicit enumeration algorithm.
The IEDGC shows the run-time of the implicit enumeration algorithm with dynamically generated
covers. Although the implicit enumeration fared better than branch-and-bound, without dynamically generated covers, it was only feasible on very small problems because all the covers had
to be determined at the start. Using dynamically generated covers significantly improved overall
computational speed. By applying it to only the branch-and-bound algorithm, it solved the model
only slightly faster than the basic implicit enumeration algorithm. However, combining it with
the implicit enumeration algorithm gave the most significant speed increase, where the Optimal
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experiment only took longer because it had the additional top level to compute. Across all prespecified topologies, the Perimeter topology was solved in the fastest time while the Dense and
Spacious topologies were solved the slowest. Finally, the additive model took longer to solve
than the non-additive model across all experiments when comparing the branch-and-bound and
implicit enumeration (both without dynamically generated covers) algorithms, again because of
the generation of the covers.
These conclusions demonstrate that more work than a traditional branch-and-bound method is
necessary to solve even smaller problem sets. For more realistic problems in which access points
serve hundreds or thousands of demand points individually, the more stable growth in complexity
from the implicit enumeration plus the speed that dynamic constraint generation provides is clearly
preferred. Table 2.3 shows a 67%-91% drop in speed, with comparable results between the standard
branch-and-bound with dynamic constraint generation and the implicit enumeration with dynamic
constraint generation.

2.6.2

Solution Quality for Different Topologies

We also compared each of the five topologies from the bi-level program with the optimal placement of access points from the tri-level program, taking Sij = 1 and thus we considered only
maximizing the total number of connections. Figure 2.4 shows the results.
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Figure 2.4: Percentage Below Optimal

The experiment names are as before. The Percentage Below Optimal value gives the percentage
difference from the optimal solution of total signal strengths jammed, calculated as

O−P
O

× 100%,

where O is the optimal objective value from the original tri-level program, and P is the objective
value from the given experiment. It is clear from Figure 2.4 that placement of the access points
near expected concentrations of demand points is essential for any network given some topology
since following certain geometries can lead to significantly diminished connectivity should an
attack occur. Access points spread too far will not allow demand points to connect to the network
(as can be seen from the Perimeter topology). Access points too clustered together give jammers
an easier time of severing connections. The Spacious topology proved to be the closest to the
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optimal placement of the access points, indicating the Spacious topology naturally gave a strong
likelihood of connecting and maintaining connection. The non-additive model consistently gave
weaker results except in the Partite topology, likely because of this clustering. In the additive
model, connections only needed to be close to jammers, and clusters of access points implied
clusters of access-demand point connections were close enough to jammers for them to be more
effective.
We then compared the additive and non-additive models directly. Because the additive model
is a more accurate representation of how the interference of jammers sums together to mitigate
network connectivity, we took its objective value as a base and measured the relative error of
the non-additive model to it. This relative error was calculated as

A−N
A

× 100%, where A is the

objective value of the additive model and N is the objective value of the non-additive model. Figure
2.5 shows the results.

Figure 2.5: Additive/Non-Additive Relative Error
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There was a significant amount of relative error across all topologies and the optimal configuration, demonstrating the large differences between the additive and non-additive models. The
Dense and Median topologies had the largest relative errors as well as the most significant changes
as more access points were added because of the clustering of demand points around clusters of
access points. A similar reasoning can be applied to the Partite topology; however, because the
Partite topology confined where access points may be placed, demand points’ ability to relocate
to maintain connectivity was limited. Limiting the locations for connections to be made allowed
jammers to not have to work as hard to jam more connections under the non-additive model. This
confinement explained why the Partite topology not only did not give as much relative error as the
Dense and Median topologies in spite of similar clustering problems but also why there was not
much of a change in relative error despite more access points placed. The Perimeter provided the
least relative error for the exact opposite reason: demand points and access points were so spread
out that jammers working together under the additive model or requiring direct interference under
the non-additive model were not able to produce as much of an effect.
One final point concerns our choice of Sij = 1. To summarize, the Spacious topology had the
smallest Percentage Below Optimal value while the Perimeter had the largest, and the Perimeter
topology had the smallest Additive/Non-additive Relative Error value while the Median had the
largest and the other three topologies were all higher than the Optimal. Under the consideration of
Sij taking any value between 0 and 33, each of these conclusions was the same (with different numerical values) except two: both the Spacious and the Partite topologies had smaller Additive/Nonadditive Relative Error values than the Optimal topology, and the Perimeter Additive/Non-additive
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Relative Error values were worse than the Optimal topology. Thus, depending on how a defender
defines the utility function, certain topologies have a stronger or weaker disparity between additive interference and no interference. Because [51] cautions strongly that the additive interference
models are more realistic, then the Perimeter topology (which had larger relative errors than the
Optimal) can behave very differently in reality (using the additive interference model) than it does
in expectation (without considering interference).
Finally, as a visual representation, we include Figure 2.6 which overlays the Optimal Topology
and Median Topology together, showing only the access point distribution and omitting numerical
details. Intuitively, robustness against jamming attacks might involve a non-clustering of access
points, of which the Median topology does except near the center. However, depending on the
demand point distribution, it may be the case that jammers are not located at specific cluster of
demand points, yet a single access point or even two may not have enough capacity to satisfy all
the demand points. As can be seen in the figure, there are several clusters of access points, and so a
key takeaway from the figure is that preconceived topological notions of access point distribution
may not yield an optimal planning strategy.
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Figure 2.6: Visual Comparison of Optimal and Median Topologies

2.6.3

Problem sensitivity analysis

We were also interested in seeing the effects of optimally adding n access points to a given
topology and improving the overall network connectivity in terms of additional connections. Here,
we ran the original model, only all initial access points’ locations had been predefined according
to the given topologies, and the first stage was considered with these locations and the optimal
placement of 1, 3, and 5 access points to each of the experiments. The optimal placement of
additional access points did not require that the points fit within any given topology. That is,
theoretically, they could have been placed anywhere, regardless of the given topology. We kept the
same utility function as before, so this experiment measured how additional access points allowed
for additional connections in the network. We then repeated the experiments with a total of 10
43

jammers to see the impacts of additional access points as more jammers attacked the network.
Table 2.5 shows the results, where each result indicates the average number of connections the
additional access points allow.
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Table 2.5: n Access Point Additions
n Additional Access Points, 5 Jammers n Additional Access Points, 10 Jammers
Experiment n = 1 n = 3
n=5
n=1 n=3
n=5
Partite-10
5.87 12.32
25.41
15.00 40.25
56.05
Partite-25
5.24 10.33
21.49
14.88 38.08
55.15
Partite-50
4.98 10.10
21.56
14.80 36.55
54.92
Perimeter-10 2.30
4.70
8.35
15.00 18.10
20.00
Perimeter-25 1.93
4.56
6.21
15.00 18.08
19.95
Perimeter-50 1.72
3.05
5.83
15.00 18.00
19.95
Dense-10
9.87 15.48
21.03
14.90 36.48
50.07
Dense-25
4.22 10.36
15.87
14.90 32.50
47.70
Dense-50
2.15
8.32
14.27
14.50 32.09
45.55
Spacious-10 9.32 18.74
28.83
15.00 45.00
59.92
Spacious-25 5.73 11.24
15.83
15.00 38.67
52.44
Spacious-50 2.11
4.83
7.07
15.00 36.60
51.86
Median-10 14.57 20.32
38.55
15.00 45.00
63.30
Median-25
9.31 11.12
16.37
15.00 40.16
62.12
Median-50
8.37 10.44
16.00
15.00 40.04
60.75

When considering the original experiment of only 5 jammers, the addition of a single access
point did not really improve overall connectivity, except in the Median topology with the fewest
access points. This was clearest when there were already a larger number of access points available.
However, in the presence of more jammers, the addition of more access points became significantly
more important. For all experiments, the optimal placement of a single new access point allowed
its capacity to be fully realized or almost so. Three new access points greatly increased the number
of additional connections across all experiments, as did five new access points. Regardless of
clustering that, as stated previously, aided jammers in severing connections, the optimal placement
of a single access point was not enough to allow for more connectivity. Thus the capacity of a
network was critical here, as adding more access points began to greatly increase total connectivity
when few access points were in place. In fact, in the presence of clustering (such as the Partite,
Dense, and the center of the Median topologies), adding more capacity significantly increased
overall connectivity with even a few access points. Finally, there was a mitigating factor present
in all columns where, as the number of access points increased for any topology, the amount of
improved connectivity was lessened. This observation was quickly seen in the presence of more
jammers, where increasing from 1 additional access point to 3 additional access points provided a
significant gain in total connections, but 5 additional access points did not provide as much of an
increase in number of connections. The placement of the access points was significant, but if the
topology already had high connectivity, then there was less of a need for demand points to connect
to new access points.
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2.6.4

Utility function changes

There are a variety of ways attackers seek to disrupt networks. Some may be more interested
in only attacking the most critical connections, while others may be more interested in severing
as many connections as possible, regardless of the strength of each connection. Equation (2.3a),
M ax

P

iI

P

jJ

P

tT

Sij xijt , is a generalized utility function that may be interpreted in differ-

ent ways, and we examine three different possibilities, which we describe below.
1. Range: each access-demand point connection has an associated strength Sij which takes a
value in the range [0, 33], as was used by Schweitzer, et al. [112], and any nonzero signal
strength implies an established connection.
2. Unity: each connection has a unit signal strength, i.e., Sij = 1, and links between demand
points and access points are either connected or not. This is equivalent to having a signal
quality greater than a threshold of 0
3. Tolerance: each connection has some associated signal strength Sij , but if Sij < δ where
δ is some nonzero threshold, the connection is considered too weak to be useful and so the
link is considered unconnected.

In the first case, it was more critical for jammers to be located where maximum signal strengths
occur, regardless of the number of signals actually being jammed, which is plausible whenever
certain devices are significantly more critical to being connected to the network than others. The
second case considered our model minimizing the sum total of xijt variables, or the total number
of connected demand points. In this case, it was more critical that jammers sought the densest
concentrations of demand points. In the final case, which is a combination of the previous two,
jammers needed to work harder to seek larger concentrations of stronger signals, ignoring those
signals that are considered too weak. In general, this effort can be more difficult because there
may be instances where there is a large cluster of connections whose combined signal strengths
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and number of connections are larger than other clusters; however, they must be ignored because
individually the connections are too weak.
To quantify the results, we ran the original tri-level program to obtain the optimal value J,
which was the total utility function value after jamming has taken place. Next, we fixed the access
and demand points and remove the jammers, and we recalculated the total network connectivity
based on the utility function, calling this U , the total utility function value if no jamming occurred.
Finally, we measured a relative error,

U −J
U

× 100%, and we called this our jamming impact. We

note that in the case of Sij = 1, U will always attain total connectivity (100% of demand points
are connected), and so the results are a measure of the percentage of jammed connections. For our
experiments, we took δ = 10 for the Tolerance utility. Table 2.6 shows the results.

Experiment
Optimal-10
Optimal-25
Optimal-50
Paritite-10
Partite-25
Partite-50
Perimeter-10
Perimeter-25
Perimeter-50
Dense-10
Dense-25
Dense-50
Spacious-10
Spacious-25
Spacious-50
Median-10
Median-25
Median-50

Table 2.6: Jamming Impact
Range (%) Unity (%) Tolerance (%)
5.35
12.17
17.55
4.83
7.32
6.73
4.12
6.98
6.02
13.11
23.48
19.98
9.76
12.99
11.67
8.00
12.24
11.43
9.55
16.73
17.31
5.26
10.05
9.38
4.97
9.32
8.67
20.41
27.34
24.04
9.02
14.55
13.49
8.87
14.09
12.52
17.34
29.60
22.16
10.42
16.02
13.68
9.87
15.67
12.51
16.78
26.06
19.45
9.14
15.38
11.56
8.65
14.43
10.03
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Here, the Range column gives a percentage of how much total signal strength was jammed,
the Unity column gives a percentage of how many signals were jammed, and the Tolerance column gives a percentage of how many signals fell below the tolerance after jammers were optimally
placed to reduce their signal quality. There was a very clear trend in the data showing that the Unity
column was larger than Tolerance column which was larger than the Range column. Also, there
were large disparities among the three columns. Notable exceptions included the Partite topology,
the differences between the Unity and Tolerance columns in the Perimeter and Dense topologies,
and the differences between the Tolerance and Range columns in the Median topology. The low
disparities between the Unity and Tolerance columns in the Perimeter and Dense topologies were
likely because any random placement of demand was likely to place the demand farther than desired from any given access point. Thus, if an access-demand point connection was susceptible
to jamming at all, it was immediately jammed. Contrast the Range column where jammers were
likely to avoid clusters of demand points that might be farther away from access points, simply
seeking out the strongest signal strengths. This analysis is further backed by Figure 2.4 for the
Perimeter topology, which had the worst objective value compared to the other topologies. A similar analysis can be applied to the Median topology and the low disparity between the Range and
Tolerance columns, where the demand points near access points, especially those near the center
of the region, were likely to have a strong signal strength. This last point is also extendable to
the Partite topology and the low disparities among all three columns because the access points
themselves were clustered together.
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2.6.5

Trend experimental results

Between each time period, jammers were allowed to move no more than R feet away from their
current positions. Ideally, understanding how the jammers behaved as they moved between time
periods allows further insights into the overall network robustness against an attack. Continuously
and optimally relocating jammers between time periods under a movement restriction should force
the jammers to behave in such a way that they seek out dense gatherings of demand points or seek
those access points that have most of their capacity filled. Under this knowledge, the defender
may be able to identify certain locations or access points that are highly critical to the overall
connectivity of the network. To facilitate network robustness insights, we examined four features:
the average percentage of connections jammed, the average distance jammers moved between
time periods, the average percentage of connections jammers shared, and the average distance any
jammer had with the closest jammer to it. With regards to the average percentage of connections
jammers shared, we illustrate this idea with an example. Suppose there are 100 demand points
and 2 jammers, and both jammers are placed such that 5 demand points are within the radii of
both jammers. Then the percentage of connections shared across the jammers is 5%. We note that
access and demand points need not fall directly within a jammer’s radius for the connection to be
jammed as in the additive model, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. However, this metric is not necessarily
concerned with the effects of jamming itself. Examining only the shared demand points allows a
defender to see which areas in the network are under threat of an attack; measures could then be
taken to mitigate an attack as clusters of jammers could identify critical infrastructures. For all
values, we calculated them for each jammer and then took the average of all five jammers. Each
jammer had a movement restriction of 100 feet. Table 2.7 shows the results.
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Table 2.7: Jammer Movement Trend Results
Experiment Interfered (%) Distance Shared (%)
Optimal-10
14.33
39.38
0.00
Optimal-25
9.67
45.22
0.00
Optimal-50
8.33
63.21
1.33
Partite-10
23.33
4.30
18.00
Partite-25
26.67
18.31
20.33
Partite-50
29.33
32.19
18.67
Perimeter-10
61.33
48.3
0.00
Perimeter-25
46.00
60.07
1.00
Perimeter-50
10.67
90.33
5.25
Dense-10
38.67
10.01
14.67
Dense-25
34.67
14.48
18.33
Dense-50
32.00
17.62
20.00
Spacious-10
18.00
15.23
3.50
Spacious-25
17.33
20.07
5.00
Spacious-50
17.33
18.90
10.33
Median-10
16.00
40.27
0.00
Median-25
25.33
28.93
8.00
Median-50
38.67
15.56
16.67

Neighbor
406.73
336.21
237.33
125.31
78.52
65.57
2358.38
3203.90
3374.44
207.49
180.96
157.73
660.86
501.28
473.33
1280.39
1147.62
1002.27

The Interfered column shows the average percentage of total of connections that all jammers
were able to interfere with across all 5 time periods. The Distance column shows the average
number of feet the jammers moved between each time period for all time periods. The Shared
column shows the average percentage of jammed connections jammers share. The Neighbor shows
the average distance any jammer has with the nearest jammer to it.
The table showed robustness in the optimal placement of access points under the original model
with the smallest percentage of connections interfered as expected. Based only on the percentage
of connections interfered, the Spacious topology was closest to the original model. Interestingly,
it was also robust from the attacker’s perspective, as there was not much change in the percentage
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of connections interfered. Schweitzer, et al. [112] found that increasing the number of access
points (not necessarily optimally) produced a mitigating effect on the overall connections added
(and thus the amount of connections that can be jammed), which was backed here. The Partite
topology also showed robustness against adding access points, an intuitive conclusion since all
the access points were clustered together. Because of the larger spacing between access points
in the Perimeter topology, particularly with fewer access points, demand points tended to cluster
closer to one another in order to establish connections. As more access points were added, these
clusters lost density, and so this topology had the most significant changes to the interference
percentage. According to its topology, this meant there were fewer other access points to possibly
be reconnected to in the event of jamming, thus providing the largest percentage of interfered
connections. Adding more access points, however, showed a significant improvement in network
robustness against jamming.
In all cases, although the jammers could have moved up to 100 feet between time periods, none
of them ever reached this limit. With the exception of a few problem instances, many jammers
shared connections, which was necessary in maximizing the impact under the additive model,
especially if the goal was to maximize jamming impact under a signal quality utility function,
either through a signal strength or a quality tolerance as explained in Section 2.6.4. Finally, with
the exception of the Partite and Dense topologies, jammers also tended to stay relatively far away
from one another.
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2.7 Conclusions
2.7.1 Discussion
Ensuring the robustness of wireless networks against attackers, as well as the development of
networks that can mitigate the effects of an attack, is an important area of research. This chapter
examines the optimal placement of access points as a means of maximizing connectivity under
the optimal placement and movement of jammers. A tri-level mixed-integer programming model
is developed, and both additive and non-additive models are considered. To solve the model, a
branch-and-bound algorithm is implemented, and an implicit enumeration scheme is developed to
produce optimal results faster. In both algorithms for the additive model, the inclusion of covers
by dynamic constraint/cover generation also significantly improved computational speed, and the
results in Section 2.6.1 show that this problem is solvable within a reasonable amount of time for
both models.
The results in the remainder of Section 2.6 consider a topological analysis of networks in
designing a network that is more robust against jamming attacks. We demonstrate that for a specified topology, optimally placing n additional access points provides the largest overall benefit to
the Partite topology regardless of the number of access points already in place, provided enough
access points are added; meanwhile, the Median topology benefits the most when a considerable
number of jammers are deployed. In general, the Partite and Median topologies are the most robust
against jamming attacks when considering utility as total signal strength, number of connections,
or as a tolerance allowance. Although our results actually show the Perimeter topology as the most
robust, there is a caveat: in general, the Perimeter topology has low utility when the demand is not
distributed along the perimeter, and so while the topology may be robust against jamming, it is not
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necessarily an optimal topology for network connectivity. In a direct comparison to the optimal
placement of access points and jammers, however, the Spacious topology is actually the closest
in terms of relative error of the objective function. Furthermore, jammers are least successful in
jamming overall connections in the Spacious topology. Jammer movement is also relatively stable
for the Spacious topology, allowing a defender to assume independence between jammer movement and number of access points and thus strategize with less variability. Across all topologies,
higher movement among jammers between time periods keeps them relatively farther away from
each other, which is an important consideration for the additive model since jammers must work
together to effectively interfere with the network. As expected, the Dense and Partite topologies
have significant sharing of connections among jammers, and with their low jammer movement and
distance, finding ways of mitigating jammers’ efficacy becomes more difficult (but more necessary).
We finally note that while the problems we have solved in this chapter are small in comparison
to real-world networks, where there may be hundreds of access points and thousands or millions
of demand points, our results show general trends of the common topologies. Individual demand
points here may be similar to clusters of demand points in the real world, where the signal strength
would increase accordingly and the threshold utility (now interpreted as the proportion of demand
points able to still access the network) may become more appropriate. For a decision maker or defender, our conclusions provide insights into certain behaviors of jammers and robustness against
attacks, such as the Partite topology being fairly robust against an attack but perhaps not the most
desirable topology given the amount of empty space inside the region demand points would inevitably find themselves in.
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2.7.2

Future Work

One possible future research regards the placement of demand. As demand points roam between time periods, they should have a higher probability of moving towards those unjammed
access points with available capacity under the presence of jamming. This would likely lead to a
stochastic programming interpretation of the problem.
Another extension relates to the access points. Our model assumed fixed access points, but
mobile access points could be considered. This idea could lead to a game-theoretic approach,
where the defender might have a constraint that considers the network “active” if the utility can be
maintained above a certain threshold for all time periods, while the attacker needs to only interfere
with the network enough to drop the utility below this threshold. This attack could be modeled with
the jammers degrading the signal strength rather than assuming jammers can always completely
jam a signal.
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CHAPTER III
DATA-LINK LAYER: MAXIMUM NETWORK LIFETIME UNDER THE THREAT OF
DENIAL-OF-SLEEP ATTACKS

3.1

Introduction
One goal of a wireless communication network is to transmit as much information as possible.

This point is even more significant when the network itself may have a limited lifespan, such as
when all the access and demand points have limited battery capacities. Such networks include ad
hoc mesh networks (AHMNs) and wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In both cases, nodes have
zero or very limited mobility. AHMNs, like other ad hoc networks, do not rely on preestablished
infrastructure and may be put together quickly but require extensive connectivity over the entire
region through a variety of devices that all communicate with one another or otherwise transmit
information (thus the “mesh” component). When a given node is somehow removed from the network, the remaining nodes can all still communicate with one another. Many U.S. military forces
rely on AHMNs using ruggedized laptops, but a more civilian example includes modernized electric smart readers, where electric meters deployed on residences communicate to one another until
they eventually reach the central office for billing and thus do not need a human reader. WSNs, on
the other hand, generally acquire a specific kind of data, usually environmental conditions for research laboratories, and all the equipment is standardized to use the same transmission types. They
are generally larger and more spread out than AHMNs, as well. Preventing several transmitters
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from transmitting information is a priority for an attacker. There are a variety of methods of how
attackers may deny service to these networks, collectively referred to as denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks. Jamming, where malicious devices broadcast signals that overwhelm legitimate signals
and disrupt network traffic, is one such DoS attack. When networks have limited lifespans, the
effective transmission of information becomes the highest priority, and rather than denying service
explicitly, an attacker may instead choose to reduce the lifespan of the network, an attack known
as a denial-of-sleep (DoSL) attack. For nodes in a network with limited lifetime, the device that
forces the nodes to be continually active and thus drain their energy more rapidly are dangerous.
These kinds of attacks can be done more stealthily than direct jamming attacks because the amount
of information transmitted is too small be detected by a human operator, and the networks vulnerable to them, such as WSNs and AHMNs, typically have large numbers of transceiver nodes that
the addition of a new, malicious transmitter node is not readily noticed. While there has been significant research both in maximizing throughput in a network that has a limited lifetime as well as
research in what denial-of-sleep devices are, how they behave, and how to detect and respond to
them, nothing has been done to merge the two ideas together. That is, we still do not know the actual impacts DoSL devices have on a network when they are deployed by intelligent attackers. The
goal of this chapter is to study the placement of denial-of-sleep devices for disrupting a network’s
ability to transmit information given battery lifetimes for each node. To this end, we develop a
bi-level mixed-integer programming (BL-MIP) model that minimizes the maximum lifetime of the
network. We also deploy an implicit enumeration scheme and analyze the impacts DoSL devices
have on networks to gain insight to this particular attack.
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3.2

Related Literature
Some wireless networks have such a unique structure that attacks on them should not typically

come from jammers but instead should come from attacking the battery source. As such, we move
from the physical layer and into the data-link layer. Padmavathi and Shan [93] provided a survey
of a variety of attacks specific to WSNs, while Satish, et al. [119] provided a survey of jamming
attacks to wireless networks in general. Deng, et al. [31] discussed path-based attacks and defenses
for general denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Physical layer security has been paramount to defending wireless networks, pioneered primarily by Wyner [125] with a memory-less wiretap channel
that was discrete and examined for secure communications in case of an eavesdropper. Foschini
and Gans [36] considered multiple antennas while Zou, et al. [134] considered cooperative relays, thus mitigating placements of malicious nodes. These methods are improved by Wang, et
al. [121] with hybrid cooperative beam-forming and jamming. A joint physical-application layer
framework for security was given by Zhou, et al. [132] by examining and exploiting both physical
signal processing and authentication of data transmissions.
With regards to energy draining attacks on WSNs, a focus of our research, Manju, et al. [73]
proposed a method to defend against DoSL devices by considering the network organization and
selective level authentication. Choi, et al. [23] adds to a security model by providing an advanced
encryption standard algorithm. Peres, et al. [100] considered generating secret keys by deriving
these keys from a single shared key all nodes in the network understood. Rafik, et al. [101] further
improves the previous method by considering user authentication and symmetric cryptography to
automate the process. Some work has been done by resource exhaustion where networks have finite
amounts of data they can transmit rather than attacking the batteries themselves. Malicious cycles
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as by Chan and Perrig [17] are also discussed, where information is continuously transmitted in
loops over the network rather than seeking out a network’s sink, thus forcing nodes to continuously
communicate with one another. Flood attacks, where multiple connection requests are sent to
the server, are another kind of energy draining attack, and such attacks have been defeated with
cryptography as Aura, et al. [6] had done. Other defensive attempts have been made in minimalenergy routing by minimizing transmission energy or distance as by Chang and Tassiulas [19].
While the research is clear on how to defend against DoSL devices, none of these papers have
considered the impacts DoSL devices have on networks.
The maximum flow with limited network lifetime, another topic relevant to our research, has
been studied in a variety of contexts. One context is the maximum lifetime of the entire network,
where once some prespecified node (usually a critical node) has been depleted, the network is
no longer active [53, 54]. This has been somewhat generalized to include an arbitrary pair of
nodes with some battery capacity at each node [70], and efforts to conserve energy as much as
possible has also been studied [18]. Further, the network lifetime problem has been studied in
the context of constrained link usage as a multi-objective optimization problem [21]. For security
purposes, the deployment of redundant nodes to enhance lifetime has also been studied [59]. An
application of the original problem with the lifetime of one battery source for disaster recovery has
also been studied [135]. The general problem has also been redefined in the context of a shortest
path aggregation tree [113]. As before, none of these papers have considered an adversary whose
goal is to directly attack the lifetime of a network.
The biggest threat to any node with a limited lifespan is a device that forces it to run continuously to drain the life, known as a denial-of-sleep (DoSL) device. There are several papers that
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discuss what DoSL devices are, how they work, and how to defend against them [104, 103, 20, 57],
as well as examining how to conserve energy by DoSL prevention [84]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, no author has examined how these DoSL devices impact the lifetime-constrained
maximum flow problem.
All of the aforementioned topics consider the network as a physical entity and attack physical
parts of the network, either the devices themselves or the batteries supplying the devices’ power. In
the network layer, direct access to the network must be achieved, and this first layer is particularly
vulnerable to malicious and otherwise anomalous communication attempts. Botnets are an everincreasing problem in wireless communication activity, and while many methodologies exist, most
of the literature assumes the botnet to be identified is of a certain type or behaves a certain way,
and many methods are created using small and/or synthetic datasets that do not scale well to large
datasets. The purpose of this of examining this layer is to detect arbitrary botnets by training on a
very large, real dataset. Defining the correct framework and selecting appropriate features are the
most important aspects of this research topic.

3.3

Problem Description
Our problem consists of a network with a set of nodes which act as transceivers: they are able

to both receive data and transmit data to other nodes. Without loss of generality, we isolate two
nodes as a source and sink where the source needs to communicate to the sink specifically, and
so all other nodes act as intermediate nodes to help facilitate the transmission of data. Each intermediate node is powered by a battery that has a limited lifespan. Once the battery has been
depleted, that node is considered removed from the network, and so the source may need to seek
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a less-than-optimal route through the network to communicate to the sink. Each node has some
required transmission power to facilitate communication along a link and a rate at which information is generated; both of these determine the rate at which the battery drains, or, more specifically,
determine the lifetime of a given node. Each link has a maximum load or capacity it can maintain
to facilitate the communication. The goal of the source is to maximize the throughput, or flow,
across the network.
Seeking to cripple the network, an attacker seeks to optimally deploy a set of DoSL devices
so as to drain the most critical nodes and minimize the throughput of the network. These DoSL
devices send out illegitimate information at a high rate so as to communicate with intermediate
nodes at a high intensity, thus draining the nodes’ batteries rapidly; the rapid draining is a result
of intermediate nodes passing more information than originally intended. Intermediate nodes cannot discern legitimate information from illegitimate information and simply see a DoSL device
as some other node desiring to pass information along to the sink node via path-based injection;
this information, illegitimate in the sense that it should not be there (and thus we will refer to it
as illegitimate information throughout the chapter), is generally acceptable information as far as
the network is concerned. This information is typically eavesdropped and given minor modifications by an adversary before an attack begins, and then this information is transmitted across the
network during an attack [31]. This extra load of information requires more energy to transmit.
We seek to solve the problem of optimally placing DoSL devices to create such an attack on a
lifetime-constrained maximum flow problem. Naïvely, the attacker should attempt to deploy the
DoSL devices near the nodes that contain the links with the largest capacities, thus reducing the
potential maximum flow. However, it is well known from the literature on maximum flow network
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interdiction that this is not an optimal strategy [4]. Another naïve approach is for the attacker to
deploy DoSL devices near nodes that have the largest battery lifespan. However, links from these
nodes do not necessarily have high throughput rates, and so attacking these nodes may not damage
the network much at all.
Instead, the attacker should attempt to merge the previous two strategies, deploying the DoSL
devices near those nodes that are being used the most, have large battery lifespans, and can contribute greatly to the communication rate. These DoSL devices also create an additive effect;
dummy information is generated by these devices that requires the nodes in the network to receive
the information which further drains the battery. More devices generate more dummy information, draining the battery at a faster rate. An analogy of two people conversing while filtering out
extraneous conversations going on around them (noise) is appropriate; more noise requires more
effort for the people conversing to not become distracted and pay more attention to their immediate
conversation. That said, there is no apparent limit on how many DoSL devices can attack a node;
theoretically, enough devices could rapidly drain a battery. Realistically, a node is more likely to
become congested with information based on its upload/download rate before it is drained, and so
a cluster of DoSL devices would become more similar to a DoS attack by overwhelming attempts
at service through the node than a DoSL attack. Also, unlike with DoS attacks where a defender
simply needs to keep an eye on which nodes are active, a DoSL attack may be more difficult to
spot as there could be a number of reasons a battery is draining more rapidly than expected, one
of which being that the defender may simply mistake dummy information for legitimate information. Unless information is being examined directly at a given node, there is not necessarily any
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strong reason to not consider the possibility that users are communicating more frequently over a
network, such as in an emergency.

3.4

Mathematical model
To model the program described in Section 3.3, we present the following Bi-Level Mixed-

Integer Programming [BL − M IP ] model, where the top level solves the DoSL device placement
problem and the bottom level solves the energy-constrained maximum flow problem. We start with
a set of nodes N indexed by i. As node i attempts to communicate to all other nodes j ∈ Vi , where
Vi is the set of nodes connected to node i, there is a transmission power Pij required for node i
to communicate with node j that drains the transmitter node i’s battery which has energy Bi and
a transmission rate Tij that allows communication. Here, the total energy used at node i over the
lifetime of the network is

P

j∈Vi

Eij fij =

Pij
j∈Vi ( Tij )fij ,

P

where Eij is the energy spent by node i

to transmit one unit of information to node j, fij is the total lifetime flow from node i to node j
and thus is the amount of information actually transmitted. We assume the links are symmetric so
that Eij = Eji ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ Vi . Further, the rate at which information is generated at node i is
Si , which acts as a supply for each node, and this information must be communicated to the sink.
Since each node has a predefined battery power Bi , there exists a corresponding lifetime for each
node Li under a given flow f = (fij )i∈N,j∈Vi , which is defined as

Bi
j∈Vi Eij Tij fij

Li (f ) = P

(3.1)

For the purposes of this model, however, we classify Li as a variable and enforce relationship
(3.1) implicitly in our mathematical programming model.
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We also have a list of possible locations K for a set of DoSL devices, indexed by k. These
DoSL devices operate by sending packets to nearby nodes, either as dummy information or legitimate information that is simply copied, with the goal of forcing nodes to continue to pass this
information along to other nodes and thus deplete the battery faster. As these attacks occur frequently, there is an associated rate of energy loss, Dik , that a device at location k has on node
i. These attacks must be small, however, or these devices may be detected early, particularly in
WSNs where operators are monitoring information and may notice a sudden spike. In general,
these devices are most effective when used to cause information to become rerouted and drain
more of the network to focus exclusively on draining individual batteries completely.
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Table 3.1: List of Parameters for [BL − M IP ]
Indices
i, j
k
Parameters
Rij
Bi
Y
Pij
Tij
Eij =

Pij
Tij

Si
Dik

Sets
N
Vi
K
Variables
fij
gij
yk
Li

index for nodes
index for locations of DoSL devices

the maximum flow a link from node i to node j can support
the initial battery capacity at node i
the maximum number of DoSL devices available
the required transmission power to transmit from node i
to node j
the transmission rate from node i to node j
the required energy to transmit one unit of information
from node i to node j
the rate amount of information generated at node i
the rate of energy a DoSL device at location k can draw
from node i

the set of nodes
the set of nodes node i connects to (forward star)
the set of potential locations for DoSL devices

the total legitimate flow from node i to node j during
the lifetime of the network
the total illegitimate flow from node i to node j during
the lifetime of the network
1 if a DoSL device is placed at location k; 0 otherwise
the lifetime of node i

Using the above notation, we define the bi-level mixed integer program [BL − M IP ] below.

Z = M in

subject to:
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W (f )

(3.2a)

X

yk = Y

(3.2b)

k∈K

yk ∈ {0, 1}

∀kK

(3.2c)

where

W (f ) = M ax

ft,s

(3.3a)

subject to:

X

(fij + gij − fji − gji ) = Li

Si +

j∈Vi

X Dik
k∈K

X

Eki

!
∀i ∈ N \{t, s} [αi ]

yk

(3.3b)

(fsj − fjs ) = fts

[αs ]

(3.3c)

(ftj − fjt ) = −fts

[αt ]

(3.3d)

j∈Vs

X
j∈Vi

X
j∈Vi

Eij (fij + gij ) + Li

X

Dik yk ≤ Bi

k∈K
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∀i ∈ N

[βi ]

(3.3e)

0 ≤ fij + gij ≤ Li Rij

∀i ∈ N, j ∈ Vi

[γij ]

(3.3f)

The top level objective function (3.2a) strives to minimize the throughput of the network by
optimally deploying the DoSL devices. The set of constraints (3.2b) ensures that all available
devices are deployed, and the set of constraints (3.2c) is the binary constraint. In the bottom level,
our objective function (3.3a) strives to maximize the lifetime throughput by solving a variant of
the maximum flow problem, where fts is the total flow from the source t to the sink s. The set
of constraints (3.3b) is the flow balance constraints between each pair of nodes to include, on
the left-hand side, both legitimate and illegitimate flow, and, on the right-hand side, legitimate
information and illegitimate information generated by nodes. Here, the DoSL device acts as a
dummy intermediate node, and its illegitimate information generation is equivalent to the ratio
of the rate of energy it can draw from a node to the amount of energy required to transmit the
illegitimate information. The sets of constraints (3.3c) and (3.3d) are, respectively, the flow balance
constraints for the source and sink nodes. The set of constraints (3.3e) is the energy conservation
constraint for each node. This set of constraints also ensures that the battery of node i cannot
be drained by a DoSL device unless the device is near the node and also incorporates the flow of
illegitimate information. Finally, the set of constraints (3.3f) ensures a maximum flow rate between
each pair of nodes across both legitimate and illegitimate information. The first term is the total
energy expenditure as a product of the energy transmission and the amount of information being
sent. The second term is the total amount of energy the DoSL device is pulling from the battery
by feeding the battery illegitimate information. Also, for the sets of constraints (3.3b)–(3.3f), we
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provide the dual variables at the end of each constraint to facilitate taking the dual formulation. To
linearize the product of Li and yk in the set of constraints (3.3b) and (3.3e) we use McCormick
constraints [74], introducing the variable zik and defining the following additional constraints:

zik ≥ Li − (1 − yk )Mi

∀i ∈ N, k ∈ K

zik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ K

[νik ]

(3.4)

[µik ]

(3.5)

By adding the above constraints to the model and replacing the problem variables in the set
of constraints (3.3e) with

P

k∈K

Dik zik , we are able to properly solve the problem because our

continuous variable Li is bounded above some Mi since each node has a finite battery. Ordinarily,
the variable zik would need upper bound constraints for each i ∈ N, k ∈ K. However, because
of the direction of inequality of the set of constraints (3.3e), they are unnecessary. Finally, we can
reformulate the above as a single level program by taking the dual of the lower level as such:

Z = M in

X

(Bi βi + Mi

i∈N

X

νik )

(3.6a)

k∈K

subject to:

X
i∈N

αt − αs ≥ 1

(3.6b)

X

(3.6c)

(αi + Eij βi +

j∈Vi
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γij ) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Vi

X

Si αi −

i∈N −s,t

XX
X
(
Rij γij −
(ik + νik )) ≥ 0
i∈N j∈Vi

X

Mi

i∈N

X
i∈N

(Dik βi +

X

(νik + δik ) ≤ 0

(3.6e)

k∈K

X
Dik
αi +
(δik + ik + µik + νik )) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Vi , k ∈ K
Eij
k∈K

X

(3.6d)

k∈K

(3.6f)

(αi + Eij βi ) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Vi

(3.6g)

urs ∀i ∈ N

(3.6h)

i∈N

αi

βi , γij , δik , ik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ Vi , k ∈ K

(3.6i)

νik , µik ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ K

(3.6j)

Thus, the reformulated model, a single-level integer program, has objective function (3.6a)
subject to the constraints (3.2b)-(3.2c) and (3.6b)-(3.6j).
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3.5 Solution Methodologies
3.5.1 Branch-and-bound
A bi-level mixed-integer program can be difficult for commercial solvers to handle. In the
upper level, we have |K| total locations for Y DoSL devices. In the bottom level, we have a max
flow problem. In a worst case scenario, we are solving |K| choose Y max flow problems, which
is computationally complex. However, the branch-and-bound algorithm developed by [80] can be
employed without much difficulty, but as we will see in Section 3.7.2, the main purpose of this
methodology is for tractability. This algorithm is presented as follows. Given a sub-problem s,
set the top level leader problem L and the bottom level follower problem F . Consider both levels
with F ’s objective value removed to be the high-point problem (HP P ). Define the vectors of the
lower and upper bounds, respectively, to be αLs and β Ls and αF s and β F s . These are controlled by
L and F where indicated. Define SsF = {q : αjF s > 0 or βJF s < U BjF } for the sets of indices of
restricted (integer) variables in s for F and similarly for L via SsL . Finally, set HSF = {(αF s , β F s )}
and HSL = {(αLs , β Ls )} as the sets of bounds. Algorithm 3.1 details the algorithm.

3.5.2

Implicit enumeration

While branch-and-bound is a classic algorithm, it does not solve this problem efficiently (as will
be seen in Section 3.7.2). To overcome this issue, we employ the implicit enumeration algorithm
developed by Scaparra and Church [111]. Here, a search tree is developed and there must be some
critical location in an optimal throughput f = (fij )i∈N,j∈Vi that can be most impacted by the place
of a DoSL device. If there is an fij in the set of elements comprising the vector f that cannot
be realized, the maximum throughput becomes worsened. Continuing down other fij elements
would thus cause fts to be minimized. Implicit enumeration starts at the root of the search tree
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Algorithm 3.1 Branch and Bound
1: Initialization: Set s = 0, the current optimal solution z = −∞, the parameters of the sets of
bounds, and the sets of indices for bounds empty.
2:

Upper bounds and fathoming: Determine the solution of HP P and the optimal objective
value, zH P P . If zH P P ≤ z or HP P is infeasible, go to Step 7.

3:

Continuous solution: Solve the relaxed single level program. If infeasible, go to Step 7.
Otherwise, fix the current solution then store it.

4:

Branching: If integrality requirements are satisfied by the current solution, go to Step 5.
Otherwise, select any fractional-valued variable and bound it. Update s = s + 1 and update
the sets of bounds and indices for the bounds. Return to Step 2.

5:

Bi-level feasible solution: Fix the current solution y (m) = (yk )k∈K and solve F to obtain
(m)
(m)
f (m) = (fij )i∈N,j∈Vi and ft,s . Compute the optimal Z. If Z > z, set z = Z, updating the
new optimal solution.

6:

Integer branching: If each U B and LB are equal for both L and F , go to the next step.
Otherwise, select one inequality from either of the sets of bounds and update the bound by decreasing the upper bound or increasing the lower bound (choice dependent on which inequality
is chosen and which set it comes from). Update s = s + 1 and update the sets of bounds and
sets of indices for the bounds. Return to Step 2.

7:

Backtracking: If no undetermined node exists, go to Step 8. Otherwise, branch to newest
undetermined node, update s = s + 1, and update the sets of bounds and sets of indices for the
bounds.

8:

Termination: If z = −∞, no feasible solution exists. Otherwise, terminate algorithm with
the optimal solution.

(m)
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and solves the lower level of the bi-level program such that no DoSL devices are placed. An
optimal throughput is thus established, providing suitable location for DoSL devices, or branches
in the search tree, and at least one of these solutions that places DoSL devices must be realized.
Branching continues until all DoSL devices are placed, at which point the branch becomes a leaf,
or until feasibility no longer exists (i.e., no more locations to place DoSL devices). The feasible
placement of DoSL devices with the largest value of the top-level object function is optimal, which
we call Z. Algorithm 3.2 details the algorithm.

Algorithm 3.2 Implicit Enumeration
1: Initialization: Initialize the node set with the root node associated with no placement of DoSL
devices, i.e., yk = 0 ∀k ∈ K, and set the optimal solution to z = −∞.
2:

Processing: Select and remove a node m from M . If n is the root node or was created from
setting any yk = 1, then solve the corresponding lower-level problem for the corresponding
(m)
(m)
(m)
vector y (m) = (yk )k∈K , providing the vector f (m) = (fij )i∈N,j∈Vi . Define OK as the set
of suitable locations for all the DoSL devices, and determine then a set of suitable locations
(m)
(m)
for each yk in OK . If Z > z, set z = Z, storing the new optimal solution.

3:

Pruning: If there is no better placement for the DoSL devices, or if OK is empty, the branch
is a leaf, and go to Step 5.

4:

Branching: Choose a location from the set of possible locations OK and create two new
nodes. One node forces yk = 1, the other forces yk = 0. Add the newly created nodes to the
set M .

5:

Termination: If the node set M is empty, terminate the algorithm with the optimal solution;
otherwise, return to Step 2.

3.6

(m)

(m)

Illustrative example
We now illustrate how the DoSL attack is performed and how it affects the network using

Figure 3.1. Here, circles represent nodes in the network, where S is the source node, T is the
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terminal node, and the other numbered nodes are intermediate. The numbers following the hyphens
within nodes are the current battery levels. The arrows represent the directions that nodes may
communicate along, where the numbers along the edges represent how much information is being
transmitted along an arc compared to how much (maximal) information can be transmitted along
an arc. The triangle represents a DoSL device, and the larger circle surrounding it represents its
radius. Within the image names, the t = X refers to the current time step (taken as arbitrary units),
so t = 10 in Figure (3.1e) refers to the tenth time step of the network. For illustrative purposes,
node S only collects data a rate of 15 units/time and the DoSL device to only send 5 units per arc
it establishes with any node.
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(a) Normal Network (t = 0)

(b) DoSL Device Placed (t = 0)

(c) Network Under Attack (t = 1)

(d) Network Under Attack (t = 5)

(e) Afflicted Network (t = 10)

(f) New Routing (t = 10)

Figure 3.1: DoSL Attack

In Figure 3.1a, we have a normal network, where information has begun being transferred
from the source node to the terminal node for a total of 15 units of information per unit time; we
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emphasize that the flows on the arcs is a per-unit flow and not a total lifetime flow. Each battery
currently has 300 units of capacity, and they will drain at a rate of 1 unit of battery per 1 unit of
information sent. As an example, after 3 units of time have passed with all nodes sending 5 units
of information per unit of time, nodes will have drained 5 × 3 = 15 total units from their battery.
At t = 0 in Figure 3.1b, a single DoSL device has been placed such that it can affect nodes 1 and
2, though the dashed line means it is not yet active.
At t = 1 in Figure 3.1c the DoSL device has begun transmitting transmitting illegitimate
information at the same rate as the legitimate information is sent (5 units per unit time). The intermediate nodes cannot discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate information, and so the
intermediate nodes proceed to transmit this “extra” information along with the legitimate information, increasing the amount of information being transferred along each arc. Transmitting more
information requires more energy, and so nodes 1 and 2 will have their batteries drained more
quickly, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1c as evidenced by the significant drop in battery capacity
compared to the others (down to 90 units compared to the others’ 95 units) and the increase in information along the arcs (increased from 5 to 10). We do not consider the power loss of receiving
energy, only transmitting energy as in Section 3.3. Flow balance is also not violated here because
the DoSL device is seen by the network as another intermediate node that has acquired information
from the source node and desires to pass this (illegitimate) information to the sink node. Thus arc
(1, 2) is increased because node 1 is transmitting extra information, and arc (2, T ) is also increased
for the same reason. Node 2 is also receiving even more (illegitimate) information from the DoSL
device, but it is transmitting at capacity, so it cannot transmit more than 10 units of information
along arc (2, T ).
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After 5 time units, we see a more significant effect the DoSL device has had on the network
in terms of draining the batteries (see Figure 3.1d). Finally, after ten time units have passed, in
Figure 3.1e, nodes 1 and 2 are effectively removed from the network as their batteries have drained
completely and they can no longer relay information. The network continues passing information
from S to T in Figure 3.1f and onward until finally, at t = 17, although S still has 50 units of
battery and can thus continue to send information, there are no nodes that can transmit information
as their batteries have drained fully. Ordinarily, the total amount of information S should have
been able to send to T was 300 units. However, with the DoSL device placed and affecting an
entire path, it could only send a total of 250 units over the lifetime of the network.

3.7 Computational analysis
3.7.1 Experimental parameters
We consider three network topologies: the Carnegie Melon University (CMU) [25], Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) [78], and a random network (Random) topology. Figure
3.2 shows the MIT and CMU topologies. The random network topology was created by uniformly
assigning 100 nodes to random locations over a region of 1 square mile with random edges dispersed such that it was possible to create a path from any node to any other node, and each edge carries a maximum of 50 bits. The set of flows was generated by randomly selecting origin-destination
node pairs in the network, and the origin nodes were selected at random without replacement such
that each trial had a unique origin node. 10 trials, or 10 random networks, were created this way,
and all intermediate nodes for each trial were selected by determining the shortest path for each
flow in the set with a predefined total number of flows for the network. The same total number of
flows was constant across all 10 trials. Table 3.2 gives the parameter values, which were taken from
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Chen, et al. [20], and we note that we set the rate the DoSL devices are able to drain information
from the nodes’ batteries equal to the nodes’ transmission powers. This setting is both for tractability purposes as well as allowing our DoSL devices to realistically blend in with other nodes as all
nodes, malicious or honest, transmit at the same threshold. All experiments were run on a 64-bit
Dell Alienware laptop running Windows 10 with 8 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700HQ CPU processors
at 2.60 GHz with 16 GB of RAM. The model and algorithms were encoded using Python 2.7, and
the modified single-level problem, each of the sub-problems in the branch-and-bound algorithm,
and each branch in the implicit enumeration’s search tree were all solved by Gurobi 7.5.1.

(a) CMU

(b) MIT

Figure 3.2: CMU and MIT networks
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Table 3.2: Network parameters
Parameter
Value
Channel bandwidth
20 kbps
DoSL devices
5
DoSL locations
30
Battery power
50 units
Data packet length
10 kb
Data generation rate
10 kbps
Data transmission power 1 unit/sec

3.7.2

Run-time of solution methodologies

First, we examined the run-time solutions of the two algorithms plus Gurobi on each of the
three topologies. To better illustrate the power or lack of power in a particular algorithm, three
experiments were made for each topology. The first experiment had 10 nodes and 1 DoSL device.
The second experiment had 50 nodes with 5 DoSL devices. The final experiment had 100 nodes
and 10 DoSL devices. Table 3.3 shows the results.

Table 3.3: Run-time of algorithms
Experiment
BB (secs) Gurobi (secs) IE (secs)
CMU-10-1
1711
131
25
CMU-50-5
11853
373
50
CMU-100-10
72242
792
182
MIT-10-1
1970
118
19
MIT-50-5
13114
380
38
MIT-100-10
59776
712
191
Random-10-1
1801
129
33
Random-50-5
15663
450
64
Random-100-10
71848
993
200
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Each row is named according to the topology used (CMU, MIT, or Random), followed by the
number of nodes in the network, followed by the number of DoSL devices placed, all separated
by hyphens. So, CMU-50-5 means the CMU topology is used with 50 nodes and 5 DoSL devices.
The BB column shows the run-time of the branch-and-bound algorithm, the IE column shows the
run-time of the implicit enumeration algorithm, and the Gurobi column shows the run-time of
running the modified single-level problem directly on Gurobi. Even on the smallest problems, a
traditional branch-and-bound algorithm was near 30 minutes and is not feasible on larger problems.
Gurobi performed well on all experiments, showing some stability in the computational time versus
problem size growth. The implicit enumeration, however, solved the problem regardless of its size
significantly faster than the other two algorithms, never taking longer than 3.5 minutes. In both
the branch-and-bound and implicit enumeration schemes, as the problem size grew, there was a
significant increase in the computational time, suggesting a possible exponential increase. Gurobi,
however, remained mostly linear.

3.7.3 Problem sensitivity analysis
3.7.3.1 Effect of the number of DoSL devices
In our first experiment, we examined how increasing the number of DoSL devices affects the
lifetime throughput. We start with 1 DoSL device and increase this number by 2 for each experiment until we have examined 15 total DoSL devices. Figure 3.3 shows the results.
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Figure 3.3: Number of DoSL devices versus lifetime throughput

The significant differences in the curves between the MIT and CMU topologies, regardless of
actual values, gives an idea that topology plays an important role in the amount of throughput received by a sink node. Under the CMU topology, which contains two bipartite regions surrounded
by the nodes, many devices must be placed in order to overcome attempts at generating throughput. On other hand, the MIT topology, which is essentially a large cluster (and would be more
indicative of sensor networks), there is a largely linear relationship with a quick drop. Under the
Random topology, because of the randomness there is no immediate understanding of how topology plays a role. However, what can be said is that except in perhaps more optimal topologies (like
the MIT topology), there comes a point where once enough DoSL devices have been placed the
throughput drop becomes very significant, as the CMU and Random topologies coincide. Military
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ad hoc mesh networks that have overall fewer nodes (because they are smaller installations) may
benefit from these non-clustered topologies since there must be a significant number of DoSL devices present to get any meaningful drop in the throughput. Sensor networks, however, are exactly
the opposite in size and have hundreds of nodes already in place, and so they may benefit from
totally clustered topologies.

3.7.3.2

Effect of the battery lifetime

In our second experiment, we examined how much increasing the battery lifetime mitigates
the damage done by DoSL devices. We started with all batteries at normal capacity and solved
the problem where no DoSL devices were placed, so the batteries drained normally; this was our
base result. We then placed 10 DoSL devices and resolved the problem which gave us our normal
result. From here, we decreased each of the batteries’ lifespans by 5% for each run until they were
operating at a minimum of 85% capacity, and then we increased the lifespans by 5% until they had
a maximum of 150% capacity. Figure 3.4 shows the results.
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Figure 3.4: Battery lifetime versus lifetime throughput

Across all three topologies, on average, there is no real significance to the battery power itself in
maximizing throughput given the mostly linear relationships. We caution and remind that the focus
of this chapter is on throughput maximization; other researchers have shown the significance of
battery power in maximizing the lifetime of a network [53, 54], and so these results are inherently
different from our own. Of course, more throughput is able to be generated if batteries can last
longer, but the takeaway here is that, under the idea that a network may be attacked, rallying to
improve the battery powers of each node may not be optimal. Instead, as in Section 3.7.3.1, the
role of the topology of the nodes may be far more critical.
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3.7.3.3

Effect of the number of DoSL devices and DoSL energy

For our final experiment, we considered the trade-off of having more, weaker DoSL devices
versus fewer, stronger DoSL devices. We considered two problems: one problem with 10 DoSL
devices with the ability to generate 30 units/second of illegitimate information to drain nodes compared against 20 DoSL devices with the ability to generate only 15 units/second and another problem where the numbers of DoSL devices for each case are doubled. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the
results.

Figure 3.5: Problem 1: 10 DoSL devices at 30 units/sec vs. 20 DoSL devices at 15 units/sec
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Figure 3.6: Problem 2: 20 DoSL devices at 30 units/sec vs. 40 DoSL devices at 15 units/sec

Having more devices, though weaker, generates a significantly larger impact on the network
as a result of more arcs being removed from the network with more nodes being removed; this
result is present even though nodes are taking longer to be removed comparatively. Simply doubling the number of devices at half the draining efficacy yields between 25-50% more throughput
being unable to be sent. Combining these results with those in Section 3.7.3.1 shows that placing
a significant number of weak (and and more importantly, harder to detect) devices is crucial to
removing as much potential throughput from the network as possible. In Figure 3.5 with fewer
devices present overall, the MIT topology suffered roughly 50% more dropped throughput while
the Random and CMU topologies suffered roughly 25%. In Figure 3.6 with more devices overall,
the CMU and MIT topologies saw nearly 50% dropped throughput while the Random topology
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saw roughly 25%. In this figure with more devices, only so much more throughput can be dropped
since so many devices have already been placed, again following the results in Section 3.7.3.1. As
both the CMU and MIT topologies are considerably different, there is some evidence to suggest
that, at some point, the topological considerations (resulting in the previous sections) actually stop
having as much of an impact in mitigating a DoSL attack once the network is overwhelmed with
DoSL devices.

3.8 Conclusions
3.8.1 Discussion
For wireless sensor networks (WSN) and ad hoc mesh networks (AHMN) where battery lifespan is critical to the transmission and reception of information, the impact of denial-of-sleep
(DoSL) devices on these networks was previously not understood. While efforts have been made
to understand DoSL devices and how to detect them, their impacts on networks has not been explored. This chapter examines the optimal placement of DoSL devices as a means of minimizing
network throughput under a lifetime constrained network. A bi-level mixed-integer programming
model is developed. To solve the model, an implicit enumeration scheme is implemented and
outperforms both Gurobi and a traditional branch-and-bound algorithm significantly.
Several experiments are also considered in the number of DoSL devices to better impact a
network, the effects of battery power in an attempt to mitigate such an attack, and whether using
fewer stronger or more weaker devices is preferred. We show that topological considerations are
very important in mitigating overall attack efficacy by increased numbers of DoSL devices, but
there is some point where topological considerations do not have much effect anymore. Overall,
however, a few DoSL devices do not significantly damage a network, and there is a point to which
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the number of devices begins to significantly affect the network’s performance. On the other hand,
initial battery levels do not readily mitigate DoSL attacks regardless of topological considerations
as we show a mostly linear relationship in the amount of throughput sent over a network to how
much battery power exists for each node. Finally, we see that quantity is in fact better than quality,
as an abundance of weaker devices will have a stronger effect than a handful of stronger devices,
and this overwhelming nature is what will mitigate topological defensive considerations. This
result comes from that fact that more nodes are being overwhelmed, eliminating more arcs more
quickly, and thus the network becomes significantly more bottle-necked along remaining arcs in
an attempt to transmit as much throughput as possible. A decision maker would need to greatly
consider both the placement of their nodes relative to the scope of the network: a WSN that needs
to stay for a long time should be fairly clustered with possible communications from node to node
as large as possible, while AHMNs that will likely not be set up for too long should employ a more
sparse topology.

3.8.2

Future Work

One immediate extension of this work is with regards to the usage of mobile DoSL devices.
As nodes’ batteries become weakened, it may not be prudent to allow this node to continue to be
drained knowing it will be depleted soon, and so a DoSL device could be relocated to a stronger
battery source(s). Furthermore, investigation into the preference of this tactic versus waiting for
a node to completely drain before relocating the DoSL device would be needed. Further incorporating mobility, inductive charging allows for wireless charging using electromagnetic induction
between two objects; a defender could carry a charging device on (for example) a drone vehicle
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to patrol the network and continuously recharge batteries, giving both the attacker and defender a
need to identify “critical paths” that are most important to the relaying of information across nodes
from source(s) to sink(s).
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CHAPTER IV
NETWORK LAYER: DETECTING VARIETIES OF BOTNETS THROUGH GENERALIZED
COMMUNICATION BEHAVIORS

4.1

Introduction
Botnets–programs designed to infect devices and receive commands from a master–are perhaps

the most debilitating problems civilian networks face and are a threat to national security in military networks. Dubbed the biggest malware attack in history, WannaCry, a malicious botnet that
infected 230, 000 computers over 150 countries, occurred as recently in May 2017 [88]. Not only
were computers affected, but also medical equipment. CryptoLocker, an attack in 2013, afflicted
500, 000 computers over a smaller area, demanding users pay $400 or have users’ files, which
became encrypted with the malware, destroyed [58].
Anti-malicious software are, unfortunately, largely reactive solutions. They need to first see an
attack before a proper response can be encoded. In order to see attacks, malware and botnets must
first be detected. Knowing what kind of malware or botnet one wants to find can help tremendously
in detecting them, be they peer-to-peer botnets or e-mail phishing attempts. And generally, these
malware have similar behaviors to one another in the same category. Unfortunately, many efforts
are made to make malware more stealthy, and thus identifying them becomes more difficult as they
are detected as legitimate communications or users. One way around this obstacle is to examine
very large amounts of data. Unfortunately, traditional machine learning attempts are easily made
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over-fit by very large data and may be incapable of detecting stealthy malware. Further, significant
effort must be put into feature engineering for machine learning to work properly, where feature
engineering constitutes deriving the correct features, such as an IP address or a communication
protocol.
This chapter will examine the detection of botnets without any prior assumptions about the type
of botnet being detected in a very large, very real dataset. This chapter will seek to identify peculiar
communication patterns by using a deep learning framework, or an artificial neural network (ANN)
directly on changes in communication where botnet traffic consists of a very small percentage of
the total amount of traffic. We deploy a artificial neural network (ANN), but we pay attention to the
data, or feature vectors, fed into the ANN. Because botnets have adapted in how they communicate,
we focus more on the actual communications than the means of communication. We then examine
a variety of accuracy metrics to see how the detection scheme performs.

4.2

Related Literature
However, cybersecurity, specifically in malware detection, is a boon of research topics that

implement machine and deep learning. Wang, et al. [122] used the CNN idea from above by taking
pictures of the botnet traffic, an unusual approach that shows both the power of deep learning
and the novelty of varying techniques. An original work in using deep learning specifically on
malware intrusions [39], which was only in 2010, relied on very basic deep learning frameworks
and revealed how this field has evolved since then. Meidan, et al. [76] actually used real botnets
on their own equipment with great results, but they only considered two botnets on nine machines.
Meanwhile, Chen, et al. [22] demonstrated the weaknesses of ANNs that focus on specific botnets
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by intentionally attacking the ANN itself with few anomalies and managed to get more than 90%
success rate, demanding a need for a robust ANN framework. Grosse, et al. [40] also pointed out
the flaws of malware detectors that rely on focused features by simply having their malware switch
continuous variables to binary variables. Strayer, et al. [117] relied on a more generalized approach
to feature selection by using flow-based communication features but limited themselves to a small
and synthetic dataset. Narang, et al. [85] converted time-domain communication parameters to
frequency-domain communication patterns, allowing for more ambiguous behavior but focused
only on peer-to-peer bots. Karim, et al. [56] used a simple logistic regression to detect botnet
applications but designed their code specific for mobile phones. Dah, et al. [28] overcame the
computational complexity of running an ANN on a large dataset with dimension reduction, but
they also relied on simpler algorithms like logistic regression that are not necessarily robust against
stealthy anomalies as their targets were clearly identifiable. A non-parametric method was used
by Saxe and Berlin [110], but could not be realistically used in large datasets of billions of pings
of data where they only tested in on a small twenty-thousand. Huang and Stokes [49] developed a
robust multi-tiered ANN to detect malware, but they focused on only two types of malware. Linda,
et al. [65] perhaps are the closest in developing a truly robust intrusion detection framework, but
they focused it entirely on critical infrastructure; noncritical infrastructure can be used to attack
critical infrastructure, which they point out as one of their own shortcomings. Pascanu, et al.
[97] attempt to get at the most abstract methodologies malware anomalies, and their results prove
promising but rely on synthetic malware training.
Aside from deep learning, traditional machine learning techniques have also been used. A
support vector machine [77] was applied to flow features, though this dataset was very small.
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Without relying on inherent communication based features, purely mathematical ones, similar in
idea to our own, were used with mixed success as the authors could only get a true positive rate
of 65% overall [37]. Further, a system was proposed [115] using similar features on a very large,
real dataset (CTU-13), but results have not been shown. However, it is well known that traditional
machine learning does not scale well to larger datasets, and there are problems with over-fitting,
whereas deep neural networks perform significantly better [62]. Nevertheless, ensemble methods
[60, 11] may help overcome these limitations to some degree, with the authors here reaching
an accuracy of 98.2% for mobile threats and better than 90% on general peer-to-peer botnets.
While there is an abundance of research, a significant amount of these traditional efforts rely on
smaller or synthetic botnet datasets. Few traditional machine learning algorithms have established
themselves on larger, real networks; when attempts have been made to scale, accuracy metrics
have led to mixed results [38]. Nevertheless, many have tried with mixed results. When limited
to specific botnets, higher accuracy can be achieved [114], but these results were still on synthetic
data. Further improvements to traditional machine learning attempts require a significant amount
of time on feature selection, and while fine-tuning models is a firm practice, this kind of work
can not only increase model complexity but also yield negligible improvements [109]. Shishir,
et al. [83] was one of major pioneers in noticing that botnets tend to be precisely structured,
giving way to the use of generalized graph-based analytics for detecting them. They were able
to detect even stealthy botnets, but they, too, relied on synthetic datasets, and they mention one
possible improvement is the use of change in communication behaviors over time, which this
chapter focuses on. More recently, and similar to our own methods, Harun, et al. [44] attempted
to examine critical communication features in looking at communication frequency, and they used
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several traditional machine learning techniques; however, their attempts to isolate limited botnet
nodes from normal nodes resulted in being unable to detect some bots.
Stevanovic and Pederson [116] provide a more comprehensive overview of machine learning
tactics for botnet and malware detection, while Saad, et al. [106] examine several botnet detection methods and make clear that there are shortcomings that researchers need to address. These
shortcomings with the literature are reliance on training and detecting anomalies on synthetic networks, only detecting specific malware detections such as DDoS attacks or phishing attempts or
peer-to-peer botnets, or modeling entirely on small networks with very limited data types. Most
authors have only considered fine-tuning their architecture to do better than what was previously
done, which, as stated, yields negligible improvements, and so there is a reliance on filtering the
data and applying what remains directly into the ANN architecture. No author has considered
a mathematical treatment of the data through rates of change to see how botnets behave in their
communication attempts, which we will accomplish.

4.3

Problem Description
A botnet is a set of nodes where at least one comprises the bot-master and the rest comprise of

bots, where the bot-master provides instructions to each of the bots that they must then carry out.
Botnets are typically relatively large where their goals may involve distributed denial-of-service
attacks or spam. Regardless of the purpose of the botnet, all bots receive commands directly from
the bot-master, and this bot-master seeks to infect as many nodes as possible and to have the
subordinate bots do the same, maximizing the botnet size (this size is not necessarily limitless).
As botnets are increasingly stealthier, detecting them outright is becoming more difficult. Instead,
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the network must be examined as a whole and anomalous communication behaviors should be
detected, though this is nearly impossible for a human operator to do as even day-to-day data may
be quite large. For our purposes, we consider just few hours of a large network, of which only a
small portion is botnet traffic, and these botnets come in a variety of types.
The goal is as thus: Detect anomalous communications (botnet flows) with high accuracy
while minimizing Type II errors. Type II errors imply that a botnet communication was flagged
as legitimate communication, and thus botnet is allowed into the network. No a priori assumption
about what kind of botnet or how it behaves in the network should be assumed, as botnets can be
drastically different depending on their nature.

4.4

Data
The dataset used is a real, large dataset known as CTU-13 [38]. This is a botnet traffic dataset

that was captured in the CTU University in the Czech Republic in 2011. In it, three types of traffic
are labeled: botnet, normal, and background traffic. There are 13 scenarios that comprise different
botnet samples, with the different botnets being IRC botnets, Spam-bots, ClickFraud, Port Scan,
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), FastFlux, HTTP botnets, and then synthetic botnets created
and controlled by the creators of the CTU-13 dataset. Table 4.1 summarizes the data and labels of
each scenario. Each row provides information on a scenario of the dataset, where each scenario
incorporates different botnets from others. The columns for each scenario each provide the overall
duration the data was taken (Duration), the total number of packets transmitted (Packet #), the
number of unique bots (Bot #), the total amount of communication flows sent across the duration
(Total Flows), and then the total number of flows belonging to each class of Botnet, Normal,
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Command-and-Control (C&C), and Background. The significance of this dataset not only is that
it is large and real, but it captures a variety of botnets (that each may behave differently from one
another) and mixes botnet traffic with normal, command-and-control, and background traffic.
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Table 4.1: Data and Label Summary of CTU-13
Scenario Duration (hours)
Packet #
Bot # Total Flows Botnet Flows Normal Flows C&C Flows Background Flows
1
6.15
71971482
1
2824636
39933
30387
1026
2753290
2
4.21
71851300
1
1808122
18839
9120
2102
1778061
3
66.85
167730395
1
4710638
26759
116887
63
4566929
4
4.21
62089135
1
1121076
1719
25268
49
1094040
5
11.63
4481167
1
129832
695
4679
206
124252
6
2.18
38764357
1
558919
4431
7494
199
546795
7
0.38
7467139
1
114077
37
1677
26
112337
8
19.5
155207799
1
2954230
5052
72822
1074
2875282
9
5.18
115415321
10
2753884
179880
43340
5099
2525565
10
4.75
90389782
10
1309791
106315
15847
37
1187592
11
0.26
6337202
3
107251
8161
2718
3
96369
12
1.21
13212268
3
325471
2143
7628
25
315675
13
16.36
50888256
1
1925149
38791
31939
1202
1853217

The total size of the CTU-13 dataset is 696.6 GB, making this problem infeasible on home
computers, and thus the need for a high-performance computing (HPC) environment necessary.
Different datasets also often have different information being tracked, where some information in
one dataset is not present in another. As such, models trained on some datasets cannot work on
others because they were built with specific features in mind. For the purposes of this research,
however, the dataset has been modified to explore generalized traits of network communications.
Information such as packet information and IP addresses are common throughout all, so trying to
focus on how communication is done rather than what data is recorded allows for a more robust
model to be made.

4.5 Methodology
4.5.1 Features
For each scenario, pings for each source IP address were clustered together into 0.5 minute
intervals with accompanying rates of change in the out-degree and in-degree (the out-degree of
a given IP address is the number of all IP addresses the given IP address communicates with,
while the in-degree is the number of all IP addresses that communicate with the given IP address),
change in the out-degree and in-degree weight (the weight corresponds to the total number of
packets sent), changes in communication frequency and duration, and the change in betweenness
centrality, where the first interval places these values at 0 by default. The betweenness centrality
for an IP address is the number of times the IP address falls on a shortest path between two other
IP addresses, and it is calculated as BC(i) =

P

u6=v6=i∈N

σuv (i)
,
σuv

where u, v, i are nodes in the

node space N , σuv is the total number of shortest paths from node u to node v, and σuv (i) is
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the total number of shortest paths that include node i. These seven calculations are, collectively,
our primary features for detecting anomalous communications. As graph-based features, they are
not concerned with the specifics on how IP addresses communicate with other IP addresses. As
rates of change, they can (theoretically) pinpoint when communications become anomalous. An
example of the importance of rates of change is with the ClickFraud botnet. Many advertisements
pay revenue based on clicks on their ads; ClickFraud botnets force computers to rapidly click
these advertisements, draining revenue from the advertisers. Simply considering the total number
of clicks to advertisements can be misleading–the advertisement itself may have embedded itself
in a website, and a user may have accidentally clicked this. If many users click the advertisement,
this number naturally increases, and it may be the case that many users went to this advertisement
over a period of time. However, if there is very little change in the number of clicks to this
advertisement, followed by a very large increase, and this is then followed by no real change, it
is likely that a ClickFraud botnet has been deployed and is active. Another example comes from
DDoS attacks, where the popularity of an issue or a person has caused many people to engage with
some websites. Legitimate increased traffic assumes a continuously increasing amount of traffic
that occurs gradually as word-of-mouth spreads. A DDoS attack, however, sees a sharp spike in
activity (representing a high change) followed by continuous activity (with no real change from the
spike). The total amount of activity may be the same, but the gradients that show when the activity
occurs may be very different.
To summarize, our model will consider the changes to the out-degree, ∆O, the changes to the
in-degree, ∆I, the changes to the out-degree weight, ∆OW , the changes to the in-degree weight,
∆IW , the changes to the communication frequency ∆F , the changes to the communication du97

ration ∆D, and the changes to the betweenness centrality, ∆BC, over 0.5 minute intervals as the
feature vectors. The intuition in using these features comes from a demonstrably proven fact about
botnets: botnets rely on making rapid, large-scale attempts at communication to other nodes in
“bursts” of time, and they make fewer of these communications to smaller degrees as time continues. This result is a highlight of [120]. Thus, tracking what occurs as time changes, or the rates
of change, is an intuitive approach to identifying botnet traffic amid normal or background traffic.
This problem will be solved using a deep learning framework.

4.5.2

Loss Function

The standard loss function for a binary classification is the binary cross-entropy function, which
is

N
1 X
yi log(p(yi )) + (1 − yi )log(1 − p(yi ))
Hp (q) = −
N i=1

(4.1)

where yi is the binary label for a given node i (in our case, 1 for botnet, 0 for non-bot) and p(yi )
is the predicted probability that i is a botnet. This loss function examines each point separate
from the others, which is typically enough in most binary models. In botnet communication,
however, botnets have no desire to communicate with other botnets; the bot-master does this. We
can exploit this fact and modify the loss function to improve accuracy by considering two new
sets of nodes: the forward and reverse star. The forward star Vi+ of a given node i is the set of
nodes i communicates with. Similarly, the reverse star Vi− of a given node is the set of nodes that
communicates with node i.
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Under the key assumption that a botnet most desires to communicate with non-bots, then the
entropy for the forward star for a botnet is

|V + |

i
1 X
(1 − yj )log(1 − p(yj ))
Hp (qVi+ (yi )) = − +
|Vi | j=1

(4.2)

The entropy for the reverse star for a botnet is

|V − |

i
1 X
Hp (qVi− (yi )) = − −
yj log(p(yj )) + (1 − yj )log(1 − p(yj ))
|Vi | j=1

(4.3)

which is the same as Equation 4.1 but replacing the appropriate sizes. This is because anything
can communicate with a botnet regardless of desire (and thus accounts for the situation where
botnets, despite not wanting to, may communicate with other botnets). With regards to non-bots,
their forward star is the same as Equation 4.3, as is their reverse star (anything desires communicate
with non-bots). We can define a new loss function as

N
1 X
Hp (q) = −
yi log(p(yi ))[B i ] + (1 − yi )log(1 − p(yi ))[N i ]
N i=1

(4.4)

where B i = Hp (qVi+ (yi )) + Hp (qVi− (yi )) and N i = Hp (qVi+ (1 − yi )) + Hp (qVi− (1 − yi )). Thus,
we fully account for the communication behaviors of botnet and non-bot traffic, as desired.

4.5.3

Neural Network Architecture

The deep learning framework used here is a sequential model that consists of three sets of three
dense layers, where dropout occurs between the second and third layers and between any two sets
(thus 5 instances of dropout). Thus, our network is 9 layers in depth. The first dense layer relies
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on a rectified linear unit (RELU) activation, one of the most popular activation methods, and has
seven neurons, one for each feature. The second layer expands to fourteen neurons, one per feature
per classification label, and uses a sigmoid activation. The final layer considers only two neurons,
one for each classification, also using sigmoid activation. The model uses the Adam optimizer
for computational efficiency; this optimizer requires little fine-tuning and is popular for benchmarking deep learning frameworks. This optimizer had a learning rate of 0.001, no fuzz factor, no
decay rate, β1 = 0.9, and β2 = 0.999, all of which are the default settings for the Adam optimizer
in Keras.

4.6 Experiments and Results
4.6.1 Experimental Setup
Because of the size of the dataset, an HPC environment is necessary, and the Onyx HPC environment was used. Table 4.2 summarizes the Onyx HPC specs.

Table 4.2: Onyx HPC Environment
Specification Type
Onyx HPC
Core Type
Intel Xeon E5-2699v4 Broadwell
Number of Cores
44
Processing Speed (GHz)
2.8
Dedicated Memory/Accessible (GB)
128/122
Environment
Cray Linux
Computational Time (hours)
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Training was performed on 90% of the dataset, with validation and testing on 10% of the data.
The splitting was performed using 10-fold cross validation, a common approach for machine learn100

ing models. The way 10-fold cross-validation works is that first the dataset is shuffled randomly
and then split into 10 groups. For each unique group, one group is treated as a test dataset with the
remaining groups as training dataset. Our neural network is fit on the training set (9 groups) and
evaluated on the test set (the remaining 1 group), generating a sub-model. The evaluation score is
retained, and the sub-model is discarded, with the process repeating for the remaining sub-models.
Once all sub-models are evaluated, the skill of the model is summarized via evaluation scores;
specifically, the mean of the 10 results is provided. This procedure helps estimate the model’s
ability to perform on unseen data and effectively gives us our desired 90%/10% split. The model
was coded using Python 3.6, TensorFlow 1.10, and Keras 2.2.4. We use the following accuracy
rates:
• FPR =

FP
T N +F P

• TPR =

TP
T P +F N

• T NR =

TN
T N +F P

• F NR =

FN
T P +F N

• Precision =

TP
T P +F P

• Accuracy =

T P +T N
T P +T N +F P +F N

• ER =

F N +F P
T P +T N +F P +F N

• F1 = 2 ∗

Precision∗T P R
Precision+T P R

Here, F stands for false, T stands for true, P stands for positive, N stands for negative, R stands for
rate, ER is the error rate, and F1 is the traditional F -score for a test’s accuracy. Thus we define,
in order, a false positive rate, a true positive rate, a true negative rate, a false negative rate, the
precision, the accuracy, the error rate, and the F -score. Defining the null hypothesis H0 that an IP
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address is a botnet, we define the true positive when a botnet is correctly identified as a botnet; we
define the true negative as when normal traffic is detected to be normal; we define a false positive
when normal traffic is detected as botnet; and we define a false negative when a botnet is detected
as normal traffic.

4.6.2

Results and Analyses

Table 4.3 shows the results for each scenario.

ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Avg

FPR
0.332
0.434
0.172
0.069
0.430
0.179
0.703
0.119
0.167
0.185
0.890
0.148
0.034
0.297

TPR
97.591
97.733
98.217
97.382
95.971
98.127
94.595
98.159
99.317
99.058
97.280
96.920
98.613
97.613

Table 4.3: Results
TNR
FNR
Prec
99.668 2.409 99.661
99.566 2.267 99.558
99.828 1.783 99.825
99.931 2.618 99.929
99.570 4.029 99.554
99.821 1.873 99.818
99.297 5.405 99.262
99.881 1.841 99.879
99.833 0.683 99.833
99.815 0.942 99.814
99.110 2.720 99.093
99.852 3.080 99.848
99.966 1.387 99.965
99.703 2.387 99.695

Acc
98.630
98.650
99.023
98.657
97.771
98.974
96.947
99.020
99.575
99.437
98.195
98.386
99.289
98.658

ER
1.370
1.350
0.977
1.343
2.229
1.026
3.054
0.980
0.425
0.563
1.805
1.614
0.712
1.342

F1
98.615
98.637
99.015
98.639
97.730
98.965
96.872
99.012
99.574
99.435
98.178
98.362
99.285
98.640

After 1, 200 epochs, we have significant results. In bold are those top three scenarios with
either the lowest false positive rate (FPR; also called fall-out) and the highest true negative rate
(TNR; also called specificity) or highest true positive rate (TPR; also called recall) and lowest
false negative rate (FNR; also called miss rate). Scenarios 4, 8, and 13 gave us the smallest FPR
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values and the highest precision (Prec) values while Scenarios 9, 10, and 13 gave us the highest
TPR values, as well as the smallest error rate (ER) values and largest accuracy (Acc) values and
F1 scores. Unsurprising are Scenarios 7 and 11 with the worst FPR values; these scenarios had
the least duration of information available. Most surprising is the consistent results for Scenario
13, which had the second largest duration of information but only 1 bot, showcasing the power of
an ANN. Scenarios 9 and 10 have the most botnets, and as these scenarios provided some of the
highest TPR values, a more heavily compromised network can allow for better detection of the
anomalies, which is important for cleaning a system.
The Avg row takes the average of all the values in a column to given an overall picture of this
model’s performance on the CTU-13 dataset as a whole; here, our FPR is 0.297%, much better than
our desired goal of 5%, while the TPR is 97.613%, much better than the desired 95%. As such, our
model is very good in predicting general botnet communication behaviors. In general, however, in
order to improve overall efficacy, a more robust feature selection would be necessary. In general,
botnets have particular, inherent structures based on their goals. Structures can be represented
via sub-graphs, and so sub-graph analysis, such as specific sub-graph shapes and features such as
diameter would be beneficial to improving the efficacy of this model.
To better see how our model performed on each scenario, we include confusion matrices for
each scenario. We note as a reminder that we tested on 5% of the data, thus indicating our significantly lower counts than the actual data amount in the CTU-13 dataset from Table 4.1.
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1
P:B
P:N
4
P:B
P:N

Table 4.4: Confusion Matrices for CTU-13
A:B
A:N
2
A:B A:N
3
A:B
1949
462
P:B 921
389
P:B 1314
48 138774
P:N 21 89076
P:N 24
A:B A:N
84
39
2
55929

7
A:B
P:B
2
P:N
0

A:N
40
5662

10 A:B
P:B 5266
P:N
50

A:N
111
60063

13 A:B
P:B 1913
P:N 27

5
A:B
P:B 33
P:N
1
8
P:B
P:N

A:N
28
6429

A:B
A:N
248
175
5
147284

11 A:B
P:B 397
P:N 11
A:N
32
94286

A:N
44
4910

Avg A:B
P:B 21381
P:N
257

6
P:B
P:N
9
P:B
P:N

A:N
403
233791

A:B
A:N
217
50
4
27674.85
A:B
A:N
8933
214
61 128486

12 A:B
P:B 104
P:N
3

A:N
24
16143

A:N
2011
1008508

For each table, the number in the top-left corner represents the scenario number. P:B refers to
the predicted botnet flows, P:N refers to the predicted non-botnet flows, A:B refers to the actual
botnet flows, and A:N refers to the actual non-botnet flows. The immediate result from all of
these tables is a lack of consistency in narrowing down total botnets; although the proportions are
similar (thus explaining the consistent rate percentages above), the model should instead be able
to more consistently constrain the actual numbers. In Scenario 9, for example, although 61 botnet
flows incorrectly identified as normal traffic amid 8933 correctly identified botnet flows seems
reasonable, this is still a very high number in its own right, meanwhile other scenarios have fewer
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overall digits. Furthermore, in Scenario 7, which only had 2 total botnet flows, and none were
actually mislabeled. Ideally, there would be a higher variance in the FPR and FNR values which
would make these matrices show values more consistent in size (where appropriate; 2 botnet flows
compared to 8994 is not a reasonable comparison). However, in order to better constrain the actual
numbers, a stronger understanding of important features would be necessary. It may be the case
that some scenarios reacted very strongly to the provided features (such as Scenario 5 with its low
false positive count of 1) and others only did so well as to be “consistently good.” While additional
features might not improve Scenario 5’s 1 mislabeled botnet flow, they may significantly improve
Scenario 9’s 61 mislabeled botnet flows.
Another possible improvement of the model is more training, but for our model’s features this
approach would not work. Figure 4.1 shows the average , accuracy, precision, and error rates over
time across all of CTU-13, and we include more epochs than our established 1, 200 to show that
our model began to suffer from over-fitting when trained any longer. Figure 4.2 shows the loss
across CTU-13, though we only provide instances of every 100 epochs to better illustrate the end
trend. For the same reason, we also omit the first 300 epochs in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Trends of Accuracy Metrics Across all of CTU-13
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Figure 4.2: Loss Trend Across All CTU-13

In both figures, trends after 1200 epochs showed an increase or decrease where neither were
desired, indicating the model was over-fitting. The precision actually increased briefly, but this
was just noise. Prior to 1200 epochs, however, trends were where they were desired, and thus our
reasoning for training for only the indicated amount.

4.6.3

Comparison to Other Work

Unfortunately, to our knowledge, few other works have considered the CTU-13 dataset from
a deep learning perspective and in classifying the actual flows. The one we found had promising
results [71]. We compare our methodology (labeled DL-9) to theirs. However, they considered
their framework on two datasets; one similar to ours that encompasses all of CTU-13, and one in
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the partition as was originally recommended [38]. They also only report the FPR, TPR, Precision,
and F1 scores. As such, we compare ours to their results that used the entire dataset and report the
same scores, and we label their methodology SAD. To further illustrate how powerful our method
is, we also compare our method to a traditional support vector machine (SVM) using a radial basis
function (RBF) kernel, which we label SVM. We also consider a smaller, 3-layer ANN that has
3 dense layers with dropout between the second and third layers, following the same setup as in
Section 4.5.3, and we label this DL-3. Finally, we use our full 9-layer ANN on the raw data, where
we omit the two non-numeric features as they are both categorical and limited in different types
yet span a very large dataset. We label this DL-Raw. Table 4.5 shows the results.

Table 4.5: Comparison of Performance Metrics
FPR TPR Precision
F1
SAD
18.74 99.34
81.26
89.40
DL-3
23.52 58.77
71.42
64.48
DL-9
0.297 97.61
99.70
98.64
DL-Raw 21.21 88.98
80.75
84.67
SVM
11.40 88.65
88.61
88.63

Across all metrics, applying our ANN performs significantly better than the other methodologies except in the TPR reported from SAD. However, they performed training on only 80% of the
data, where ours was done with 90%. While 80%/20% training/testing splits are commonly used,
it is becoming more recommended that with very large data, such as CTU-13, the training portion
is larger; however, there is no optimal or rigorous split, although some efforts have been made to
determine the most appropriate split for a given data size [33]. We believe the 1.7% difference TPR
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can be explained by the 10% difference in training size. What is significant, however, is that our
F1 is larger, indicating our model can be more accurately applied to other data, though we do note
that this value is more influenced by the larger Precision value which is in turn influenced by the
significantly lower FPR value. While accuracy, precision, and error rate are all useful for insights,
a model can perform well according to these metrics by correctly evaluating all the non-bot traffic
because of the magnitude of the non-bot traffic relative to the botnet traffic. Incorrectly identifying
botnet traffic would have minimal impact on accuracy and error rate. On the other hand, precision
is influenced entirely by false positives and true positives, where false negatives are significant to
the stability or instability of the network; misclassifying normal traffic as botnet is not as severe
as misclassifying botnet traffic as normal. The F1 measure considers the actual classification of
botnets, or the TPR, along with the precision. The higher the F1 , the better overall the detection
methodology.
Compared to the models, our larger ANN surpasses the 3-layer one in all aspects, though
a traditional SVM also surpassed the smaller network, indicating strong evidence that both the
architecture and the size of the network are important for improving overall accuracy. Further, the
feature choice is also important, as our model performed better with our custom features than it
did with raw data. However, the architecture itself is still valuable when comparing DL-Raw to a
smaller ANN, DL-3, or the SVM.

4.7 Conclusions
4.7.1 Discussion
Reliably detecting botnets and other anomalous communication is a considerably important
topic that has gained popularity relatively recently with the improvement of artificial neural net109

works (ANNs). However, most efforts, while significantly powerful, suffer in three major areas: a
priori assumption on the botnet traffic, relying on small or virtual or synthetic datasets, and examining only specific botnet structures. We proposed a more general botnet detection methodology
that sought only communication-based behaviors as features with only one assumption: a botnet
should behave differently from normal traffic.
To this end, we deployed a 9-layer sequential ANN, meaning each layer follows directly from a
previous layer, that was able to detect botnets across a very large, real dataset, the CTU-13 dataset,
with a false positive rate of 0.297% and false negative rate of 2.387%; our true positive rate was
97.613%. Individually, we found that multiple bots had a higher likelihood of being found. Botnets are also easily detectable if the number of botnet communications has a significantly large
amount compared to normal communications (ignoring command and control flows and background flows). However, even if botnets attempt to blend in with the surrounding communications
through deception or stealth, they exhibit some underlying structures that makes them detectable
when employing graph-based analytics. Such underlying structures are also the limitations of this
work; we do not, for example, consider sub-graph properties, such as the general shape of a subgraph centered around a given node. Further, we are only looking at the communication behaviors
over intervals of time; consequently, our time intervals may be capturing too little information to
accurately determine botnet behavior.

4.7.2

Future Work

Because we were detecting a variety of botnets without much assumption on how they actually behave, our methodology could be modified to better exploit specific behaviors that other
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researchers have used to improve accuracy. Further, there are some communication features we
have not considered. Botnets, when not trying to infect other nodes, absolutely only communicate
with other botnets or the bot-master to give or receive instructions; they do not, for example, distribute malware to an already infected computer. So identifying times of infection and links that
caused the infection as a feature by looking into the reverse star (a list of all nodes that communicated to a given node) of a given address can provide insights to improving the model. Similarly, a
more thorough examination of the forward star (a list of all nodes that a given node communicates
with) to see what sort of communication was made can further improve the model. Furthermore,
as established, botnets are likely to “stand out from the crowd,” and so examining sub-graph features and isolating sub-graphs and examining patterns of these isolated sub-graphs could yield
significant improvement because the underlying botnet structure is being captured.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

5.1

Discussion
Wireless communication networks are complex structures, but they have become so essential to

everyone’s lives that they must be maintained and kept safe as they contain both personal important
information such as passwords to our bank and medical information as well as classified military
information. However, it is their complex nature that makes them easy targets from a variety of
sources as well as making them difficult to defend. This dissertation proposes the idea that the
robustness of networks to survive attacks from a variety of attacks is just as important as research
into the defense of these attacks. Networks come in several abstract layers, and this dissertation
will examine three of them: the physical layer, the data-link layer, and the network layer.
At the physical layer are jamming attacks that can disrupt a network’s nodes completely, rendering them useless. We propose the optimal deployment of a new network’s access points that
can maintain connectivity in the advent of an also optimal jamming attack; networks robust against
these attacks both maintain connectivity and, as our experiments showed, can reveal insights into
jamming efficacy on their network. However, several networks are already installed, and so we
also consider both how robust common topologies are against optimal jamming attacks as well as
the effects of optimally placing new nodes onto the preexisting topology and examining this new
network’s robustness.
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At the data-link layer, where efficient communication transmission is necessary, jamming attacks may be quickly identified, and so the denial-of-sleep (DoSL) attack comes into play. These
attacks prey on the limited batteries of the network’s nodes, and they send just enough data to
not warrant immediate suspicion by operators who expect their networks to continuously send information. Here, we examine the optimal deployment of these DoSL devices to examine how a
network can handle such an attack by considering the network’s throughput compared against a
normal throughput value. A robust network will still be able to maintain the transmission of a significant amount of throughput over the lifetime of its network, where the lifetime of the network is
defined when a source node can no longer reach a sink node because all useful intermediate nodes
are inactive. We have presented a model that provides insights to this problem and these kinds of
attacks.
At the network layer, physical devices are no longer essential, and now the attackers are trying
to gather information rather than stop their spread. Malware and botnets infect vulnerable targets
and mine information or pass along the infection to more and more computers until either relevant
infrastructure is infected (to gather classified data from a central hub, as an example), a significant
amount of infrastructure is infected, or until the right information has been gathered, such as important passwords, documents, or bank or medical information. As these malicious users rely more
on stealthy acquisition methods, detecting them becomes increasingly difficult. As such, we have
presented a means of detecting these malicious users via generalized parameters, having providing
a model that will do so effectively.
Ultimately, the importance of defending a network cannot be understated. This dissertation
examines not just one major area but three and unites them into a multifarious robustness exami113

nation of networks in general. We examined the jamming attack and will examine the DoSL attack
and botnet detection. This dissertation’s results provide valuable insights into keep networks safe
at several, different levels.

5.2

Future Work
There are many directions that this work can aspire to in keeping the theme of a multi-layered

robustness analysis of a wireless network. One major direction is a thorough analysis of a “throughput attack.” Here, an attacker places both jammers and DoSL devices on a given network, relocating them as needed, in order to negatively impact the amount of information the network can
actually transmit. Within the legitimate information, the attacker may also send malicious communications. The defender needs both a robust network in order to mitigate the immediate attack
as well as a neural network in place to detect the malicious information. Given a network topology where a source node seeks to transmit information to a sink node, where each node consumes
power in order to generate and transmit information to the sink, and where some devices are placed
to eliminate nodes or transmit malicious communication, a defender or network operator could determine how robust against such a multi-layered attack the network is by determining how much
legitimate information has actually reached the sink compared to how much could have reached
the sink without any attack.
Further, examining attacks on the remaining four layers is also a consideration. A type of attack
on the transport layer could push the network bandwidth to its limits. An attack on the session layer
could prevent the administrator from performing switch management functions on Telnet server
software. An attack on the presentation layer could force afflicted systems to continuously restart,
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halting any work being done. Finally, an attack on the application layer could force all resources
to be consumed, such as processing speed and CPU load, causing a major shut-down of individual
nodes in the network. Examining each of these attacks together would provide valuable insights in
determining just how at-risk even secure wireless networks really are; while it is questionable as to
the legitimacy of an effective seven-layered attack, understanding the role of critical infrastructure
and noting inherent vulnerabilities could provide defenders valuable insights to safeguarding the
most important parts of any network from any attack.
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